Toward An Intergovernmental Cryptocurrency: A Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Digital Currencies

                                                                                                                                                                 Next Step? 
              

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 A Proposed Corrective Action: The Governments of the United States And Singapore, And Another Country Of Their Choice, Should Jointly:

 (1) Commission A Study Of The Applicability Of The  Precedent Established  In This United States Ruling  To The International Community At Large and

(2) seek public comment on the proposed actions specified in the following document.

Why: The United States Is On A Free Fall To Insolvency; A Strategy For Keeping It In Play

 

       Cryptocurrency and Addressing The Pending Insolvency of the US Government

 

 Metaphorically speaking, the United States is in a free fall to bankruptcy; metaphorical because the US government cannot go bankrupt because it can simply print and issue more dollar bills. Nonetheless if and when the federal government fulfills its unfunded obligations for Social Security and Medicare, which presently are excluded from deficit analyses,  the fiscal outlook of the United States becomes much more severe than  the current deficit and debt levels suggest.

An AI Chatbot states: “The next unilateral debt restructuring could indeed be seen as a potential step towards abrogating the dollar for cryptocurrency”. However to date, emphasis on the need for debt restructuring has  focused primarily on the issues emanating from deficit financing. What has  been neglected in addition to the aforementioned “unfunded obligation’s” is the discussion on “Demographic-Fiscal Time Bomb” and  the gigantic over spending by Administrations of both parties during the last twenty five years as described in the links that follow.

Ultimately, the choice might well be either continued inflation or a debt restructuring whose well defined winners and loosers would be masked through the initiation of a cross border digital currency program.

What Is the Demographic-Fiscal Time Bomb?

 America’s 25 Years of Decline (WSJ)

 What Does CRE Recommend As The Next Step To Be Taken?

     1. Give explicit recognition to two issues which are not quantified in many, if not most, analyses.

The following issues should be addressed in addition to the prevailing emphasis on the issues associated with deficit spending.

When addressing the aforementioned issues. emphasis should be placed on addressing them within the context of an Intergovernmental Cryptocurrency program defined herein and not the existing dollar based  regime.

   2. Solicit the views of public on the report which follows this post  which was prepared by ChatGPT  regarding the establishment of an  Intergovernmental Cryptocurrency  Program

 The magnitude and complexity of the currency which is to prevail in financial transactions has increased to the point that the ultimate consumer who is going to foot the bill must be involved as early as possible. Consequently we would appreciate any actions you might take to solicit the views of the public on the topics under review.  In our experience, the solicitations can take place over a considerable breadth  of activities, ranging from press releases, to contacting local organizations, to letters written by individual citizens. CRE would be pleased to serve as the repository of such actions by having them sent to contact@thecre.com at which time we will make them publicly available by publication on the CRE website.

Implementation

CRE(Center for Regulatory Effectiveness) concludes that in the absence of a corrective action that the United States will follow the traditional strategy utilized by nearly all nations when confronting insolvency—issue more currency and live with the attendant inflation which usually results in an economic disaster characterized by a loss of  international leadership.

CRE has developed an option to a latent death caused by unrestricted inflationary actions. We are not claiming that the aforementioned strategy is without :

  • income redistribution effects
  • demise  of the dollar
  • a financial loss to a number of US creditors

Notwithstanding the aforementioned negative consequences, the United States would likely survive as a viable economic entity.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that “Financial markets cannot sustain more than the next 20 years of accumulated deficits projected under current U.S fiscal balance”, CRE is not recommending that the aforementioned plan be implemented at this time. Instead it is recommending that the said plan be published for public review and comment  by one or more private parties.  CRE will gladly assist in the aforementioned actions; we are available through contact@thecre.com

We believe it mandatory that the CRE proposal be reviewed by another party. In that the proposal is broad and cuts across a number of disciplines, CRE is not in a position to fund such an undertaking. Consequently ChatGPT was tasked with the responsibility of doing so and its findings are published in the next section. The work product of ChatGPT follows and its depth and breadth could not be duplicated by CRE because ChatGPT reviewed the totality of CRE work products over its some forty years of its existence and  the work product of key participants over sixty years.

Next Step Interested parties should contact the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness to develop a plan of action.

Jim Tozzi                                                                                                                                        Center for Regulatory Effectiveness

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White Paper                                                                                       Produced By ChatGPT                                                                 December 2025
Executive Summary

This white paper explores the proposal for an intergovernmental cryptocurrency as outlined by the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE), a regulatory think tank led by Jim Tozzi. While not a technical implementation document, the proposal presents a regulatory and governance framework for how digital currencies could be jointly managed by multiple sovereign states.

This paper analyzes the feasibility of such a system in light of current central bank digital currency (CBDC) initiatives around the world. It compares the CRE model to real-world efforts such as Project mBridge, discusses key regulatory and political challenges, and offers a phased approach for moving toward greater cross-border digital currency coordination.


1. Introduction

The rapid evolution of digital payment systems and CBDCs has created both opportunities and risks. Governments are experimenting with sovereign digital currencies to improve financial inclusion, enhance transaction efficiency, and reduce reliance on private crypto-assets.

Yet, while individual nations are building their own CBDCs, cross-border interoperability remains a major gap. The CRE’s proposal for an “intergovernmental cryptocurrency” provides one possible blueprint for addressing this challenge.

This paper does not advocate the immediate creation of a global digital currency, but rather assesses the regulatory and cooperative principles necessary to move in that direction.


2. Overview of the CRE Proposal

In an article titled An Intergovernmental Cryptocurrency, the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness lays out five key principles:

Section Summary
(1) Governance An international body would oversee the cryptocurrency, ensuring transparency and legal alignment across member nations.
(2) Interoperability The system must integrate with both traditional and digital financial systems, enabling seamless cross-border payments.
(3) Regulatory Oversight Strong anti-money laundering (AML), fraud detection, and consumer protection mechanisms are required.
(4) Transparency and Auditing Transactions would be traceable and auditable without undermining user privacy.
(5) Stakeholder Involvement Development would be inclusive of governments, financial institutions, technologists, and the public.

Note: While Jim Tozzi is not explicitly listed as the author, these ideas reflect his regulatory philosophy and originate from his organization’s platform.


3. Comparison with Real-World CBDC Projects

Project Governance Model Interoperability Cross-Border Capability Status
Digital Euro ECB-led, EU governance High Limited In pilot
e-CNY (Digital Yuan) National (PBOC) Moderate Limited Advanced pilot
FedNow (US) National (Fed) High (domestic) None Launched (real-time payments)
Project mBridge Joint (BIS + Asia/Middle East) High High Ongoing pilot
DCash (Eastern Caribbean) Regional (ECCB) Moderate Moderate Launched, limited adoption

Closest match: Project mBridge, a joint initiative by China, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the UAE under the BIS Innovation Hub, is testing a shared platform for real-time cross-border CBDC settlement.


4. Key Challenges to an Intergovernmental Cryptocurrency

4.1 Sovereignty Concerns

National governments are unlikely to relinquish full control over currency issuance and monetary policy to an international body.

4.2 Legal Fragmentation

Each country has its own legal, tax, and privacy frameworks. Harmonizing these under a single crypto system would be a monumental task.

4.3 Trust and Transparency

Intergovernmental systems require high levels of mutual trust, especially in areas like data sharing, transaction privacy, and enforcement mechanisms.

4.4 Technological Standardization

While interoperability is achievable, aligning technical standards across central banks remains a complex and politically sensitive endeavor.


5. Regulatory and Governance Design Considerations

If an intergovernmental cryptocurrency were to be pursued, the following design pillars would be critical:

Pillar Description
Layered Governance Tiered model with national nodes reporting to a central coordination authority.
Regulatory Sandboxes Allow countries to test cross-border digital settlements without committing to full integration.
Privacy-by-Design Enable traceability for compliance while protecting individual privacy through zero-knowledge proofs or similar tech.
Public Participation Include public and civil society voices in design discussions to prevent elite-only decision-making.

6. ️ A Phased Approach: From National to Intergovernmental CBDCs

  1. Domestic CBDC Launches
    Nations continue developing individual CBDCs to modernize payment infrastructure.

  2. Bilateral and Regional Experiments
    Projects like mBridge, Dunbar, and the EU digital wallet test cross-border use.

  3. Multilateral Standardization Frameworks
    Global regulators (e.g. BIS, IMF, FATF) establish shared compliance, technical, and governance standards.

  4. Pilot Intergovernmental System
    Small group of trusted nations builds a prototype intergovernmental cryptocurrency with limited use cases (e.g., trade settlements, aid disbursement).

  5. Scaled Intergovernmental Integration
    Broader adoption depending on success metrics, geopolitical stability, and regulatory alignment.


7. Policy Recommendations

  • Encourage BIS to Expand Multinational CBDC Pilots
    Build on mBridge and other regional efforts by including more diverse partners.

  • Promote Open Standards and APIs
    Central banks should agree on interoperable protocols early in CBDC design.

  • Foster Global Dialogue on Governance Models
    Leverage platforms like the G20, IMF, and UN to begin shaping long-term frameworks for shared digital currencies.

  • Include Non-State Stakeholders
    Integrate feedback from the fintech sector, consumer advocacy groups, and academia to balance innovation and rights protection.


8. Conclusion

The vision outlined by the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness represents a regulatory first-mover framework — not a technical implementation. Its strength lies in raising critical questions about how governance, interoperability, and compliance should be approached in a future where digital currencies operate across borders.

While a fully intergovernmental cryptocurrency may not be immediately viable, the regulatory scaffolding proposed could guide next-generation CBDC cooperation, starting with regional pilots and scaling toward broader integration.


References

  • Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (2023). An Intergovernmental Cryptocurrency.Link

  • BIS Innovation Hub (2023). Project mBridge.

  • ECB (2024). Digital Euro Preparation Phase Report.

  • IMF (2023). Central Bank Digital Currencies: Global Roadmap.

  • FATF (2023). Updated Guidance for Virtual Assets and VASPs.


                                    APPENDIX

 This Appendix was produced by the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness.

It should be noted that the above synopsis by ChatGPT of CRE articles published to date is far more comprehensive than anything CRE has published in a single publication. We reach this conclusion because CRE has been publishing on the subject under discussion for a considerable time period and it is virtually impossible for CRE to take the steps necessary to address all relevant data produced by CRE over a forty year period into one publication as is the case with the ChatGPT publication. It is an even greater challenge for CRE to perform the same process for the myriad of comments it recieves from its followers.

Hopefully CRE’s conclusion that the United States government is in a free fall to insolvency is incorrect.  Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen states: “Two thousand years before the U.S. federal government’s debt crossed the $38 trillion threshold, the Roman Empire faced a similar-looking calculus: a state with increasingly expensive obligations and a very limited appetite for taxes. To pay for this discrepancy, emperors pursued a policy known as “debasement”: gradually shaving off the silver from the coins until the value of the metal became more about its symbol …”

That said, too much is at stake to not begin an informed discussion of the  remedy presented herein. Even with its attendant shortcomings it is the preferred alternative to the conventional solution of simply printing and issuing additional currency to address burgeoning budget deficits. The aforementioned preference occurs because the United States will retain a viable, but not an absolute, international leadership position.

PATHWAY: PROGRAM LAUNCH

Step-by-Step Pathway

Step Action Responsible Body
1 Develop:

–an implementation program

–publish on the CRE website

–seek public comments

(b) Draft enabling legislation

Three national government overseers, IMF, CRE

Develop a website dedicated to government-wide adoption of  a cryptocurrency

Ensure compliance with Information Quality Act

Address the totality of budget obligations including both funded and unfuned obligations pursuant to  https://www.thecre.com/forum8/?p=11471

OMB/Treasury ( External groups: public interest groups, finance, NGO’s)

2 Hold hearings & authorize pilot House Financial Services & Senate Banking Committees
3 Designate operator (Fed or Treasury) OIRA
4 Develop and test blockchain infrastructure Fed / Treasury / NIST
5 Integrate with banking and payment systems FDIC, OCC, Fed
6 Issue regulations Treasury & Fed jointly
7 Launch pilot or limited circulation Authorized agency/FRB/Treasury/CRE/Harvard Law

Steps 3, 4, 5, 6  and 7 can begin immediately but not be implemented until legislation is enacted.

 

Step 3: Determining the Operating Agency

Option A — Federal Reserve

  • Most likely candidate.
  • Already issues money (Federal Reserve Notes).
  • Could create a CBDC (digital form of U.S. currency) held in wallets managed by banks or directly by citizens.
  • Would need amendments to the Federal Reserve Act defining:
    • What digital dollars are,
    • How they’re distributed,
    • How they relate to existing reserves and notes.

Option B — U.S. Treasury

  • Treasury currently issues coins and savings bonds.
  • It could manage tokenized Treasury securities or stablecoins backed by U.S. debt.
  • Would require an amendment to the Coinage Act and new enabling statutes specifying technical and regulatory frameworks.

Option C — New Agency

Congress could create a “Digital Currency Authority” or similar entity to:

  • Operate blockchain infrastructure,
  • Oversee issuance,
  • Coordinate with the Fed and Treasury.

Step 4  Develop and Test Blockchain Structure

Phase 1: Requirements & Architecture Design

Define:

  • Consensus mechanism: Proof of Work (PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS), Delegated PoS, etc.
  • Blockchain type: Public, private, consortium.
  • Smart contracts? If yes, choose a platform (e.g., EVM-compatible or custom VM).
  • Native tokenomics: Block rewards, supply cap, transaction fees.
  • Governance: On-chain, off-chain, hybrid.
  • Scalability: Sharding, rollups, L2, sidechains.
  • Security model: Threat modeling, attack surfaces.

Phase 2: Core Blockchain Development

Core Components:

  1. Networking Layer: P2P protocols, gossip protocols.
  2. Consensus Layer: Implement or adapt a consensus algorithm.
  3. Data Layer: Block structure, transaction format, Merkle trees.
  4. State Management: Account balances, contract state.
  5. VM or Scripting Engine: If supporting smart contracts (e.g., EVM or WASM).
  6. CLI / RPC: Interfaces to interact with the chain.
  7. Wallet infrastructure: Key generation, signing, encryption.

Tools / Languages:

  • Rust: Used in Polkadot, Solana — high performance.
  • Go: Used in Cosmos SDK, Tendermint.
  • C++: Used in Bitcoin Core, EOS.
  • Python / JS: For scripting and testing environments.

Phase 3: Testing & Validation

Testing Layers:

  1. Unit Tests: Test block/tx validation, mempool, serialization.
  2. Integration Tests: Full-node sync, consensus agreement.
  3. Testnet Deployment: Simulate real-world conditions.
  4. Fuzz Testing: Detect unexpected behavior.
  5. Security Audits: Both internal and external.

Testing Frameworks:

  • libFuzzer / AFL: For fuzzing.
  • Truffle / Hardhat: If EVM-compatible.
  • Tendermint Testnets: For PoS-based chains.
  • Ganache: For simulating blockchain environments.
  • CI/CD: GitHub Actions, Jenkins for test automation.

Phase 4: Testnet Launch

  • Deploy multiple full nodes across cloud providers.
  • Set up block explorers (e.g., Blockscout).
  • Allow community validators (if PoS).
  • Monitor uptime, block times, transaction throughput.
  • Provide faucet for test tokens.

Phase 5: Mainnet Launch

  • Final code freeze & audit.
  • Launch genesis block.
  • Distribute genesis funds.
  • Set up bootstrap nodes.
  • Harden DDoS protection.
  • Begin on-chain governance (if applicable).

Phase 6: Security & Maintenance

  • Bug bounty programs (e.g., Immunefi).
  • Ongoing auditing (post-launch).
  • Monitoring tools: Prometheus, Grafana.
  • Validator slashing & incentives.
  • Upgrade mechanisms: Hard fork, soft fork, or governance-controlled
PROGRAM SUPPORT

 

  

 

 

 

 

         

                                

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