The Other Side of the Coin

Other posts on this website chronicle the contributions our organization has made to the management of the administrative state.

These contributions have to be augmented by our failure to exercise a unique opportunity to address the issue of the century.

In the early seventies, the Quality of Life Review designed and implemented by the Nixon Administration, placed OMB in a central position to delineate the environmental issues to be addressed with the necessary resources.

One day, in the early seventies, we received a call from a NASA scientist. He explained that he was going out of the chain of command but would like to visit on non-government  time, Saturday, to discuss a very contentious  issue.

Why The Congressional Review of Common Law in Lieu of Regulations?

The literature is replete with the need for Congress to review regulations. Among the many arguments advanced in support of this idea is that Congress has delegated too much authority to regulatory agencies and  the Congress must act to address the shortcomings in regulations promulgated by regulators. Nonetheless it appears that it is unlikely that the Congress will  have the resources  to review the aforementioned regulations.

Even if the Congress were only to review the most cosmic regulations, at best they are reviewing a very small piece of the regulatory pie.  On the other hand if the Congress were to review  the legal doctrines inherent in common laws they would then be addressing policies which cut across a wide range of agencies and issues.

Why are we interested in how Common Law is established in the US?

Our interest dates back to the late 1960’s when some of the current employees of the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, then career employees in the Johnson Administration,  were advocates of (1) conducting benefit-cost analysis of regulations and (2) having OMB review the aforementioned benefit-cost analyses.

A number of the members of the administrative bar were adamantly opposed to the above recommendations which when implemented constitute centralized regulatory review. The aforementioned individuals argued that the enabling  statutes directed a particular federal agency  to issue a regulation, not the President, and that centralized regulatory review was either an illegal action or a toxic instrument of public policy. These biased and undocumented  observations became engrained in future generations of attorneys by law school faculties whose graduates often became  overseers of the administrative state and were in a position to jeopardize  the fundamental building blocks of the common law dealing with centralized regulatory review.

Public Dialog: The Birth of a Legal Doctrine in the Administrative State

Utilizing the services of Academia.edu we are able to provide a forum for a continuing debate of CRE’s view that the common law that provides for the management of the administrative state should be subject to an impartial review pursuant to the mandates of the Administrative Conference of the United States. See this post.

A Multidisciplinary Review of Common Law in the Administrative State

Initiating Post and Sponsoring Host

This page is dedicated to publicizing established pathways to our single objective, the initiation  of  A Multidisciplinary Review of Common Law in the Administrative State.

 

                              Pathways to the Multidisciplinary Review of Common Law

10/01/2021

10/02/2021

10/04/2021