Internal Administrative Law
From: Michigan Law Review
Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1239 (2017).
More and more, presidents and executive branch officials rely on internal issuances and internal administration to achieve policy goals and govern effectively. The causes of this agency move to internal administration are varied: Most prominent perhaps is the overall trend towards administrative governance in response to polarized politics and legislative gridlock, a trend evident in growing reliance on regulatory measures in general, and not just on internal administrative law. Other factors include searching judicial review and transformations in the form of regulation, such as greater privatization and devolution or the rising importance of national security and crisis governance. Whatever the cause, the growing centrality of internal administration is evident across a broad range of substantive areas. To give just a few examples: interagency arrangements are important parts of recent environmental and financial regulation and national security initiatives; guidance and enforcement policy play an increasingly central role in education and employment contexts; and administrative oversight, negotiated agreements, and funding protocols have significantly affected the shape of contemporary federalism. Equally, if not more, significant is the growing number of issuances from centralized entities like the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), governing everything from regulatory promulgation and analysis to agency use of guidance, budgeting, enforcement policy, and peer review.
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