Archive for January, 2018
GAO Criticizes the Regulatory Flexibility Act Analyses of Financial Regulators
From: US GAO
Financial Services Regulations:
Procedures for Reviews under Regulatory Flexibility Act Need to Be Enhanced
GAO-18-256: Published: Jan 30, 2018. Publicly Released: Jan 30, 2018.
What GAO Found
To comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), agencies generally must assess the rule’s potential impact on small entities and consider alternatives that may minimize any significant economic impact of the rule (regulatory flexibility analyses). Alternatively, agencies may certify that a rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. GAO found several weaknesses with the analyses of six financial regulators (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) that could undermine the goal of RFA and limit transparency and public accountability, as shown in the following examples.
Old and New: Rational Government
Editor’s Note: The Radin study, “Science and Policy Analysis in the U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs” is available here.
From: Administration & Society | Editorial
First Published January 11, 2018
Data Sharing in the Federal Statistical System: Impediments and Possibilities
From: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Amy O’Hara, Carla Medalia | U.S. Census Bureau
While federal agencies have engaged in data sharing for decades, current systems of exchange must be transformed in order to meet the growing needs of analysts in public policy, program evaluation, and basic research. Primary barriers include both perceived legal barriers and actual financial barriers. To address these problems, the potential path forward could include mandating data sharing for key sources, increasing transparency, and improving efficiency by making it easier for agencies to share data (including developing standards, templates and incentives). An agency within the Federal Statistical System should serve as a clearinghouse for centralizing this work. The Census Bureau, with its experience and uniquely broad authority to seek data from any public or private entity for statistical purposes, is well-positioned to fill this role.
Forcing Regulators to Put Society First
From: The Regulatory Review
Scholars argue for legal mandates requiring regulations to do more good than harm.
Reflecting on their experiences working in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) during the Bush Administration, former OIRA Administrator John D. Graham and his former Counselor, Paul R. Noe, urge legislators to require regulators to adopt an outcome-oriented approach to regulatory excellence.
Does Haste Make Waste? How Long Does It Take to Do a Good Regulatory Impact Analysis?
From: Administration & Society
First Published August 21, 2013
OIRA’s Lineage and Enforcement Responsibilities
From: Notice & Comment | A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice
by Jim Tozzi
Professor Rudalevige’s insights provide invaluable guidance to the political leaders of the incumbent Administration and to OIRA managers as OIRA expands its product line from the review of individual regulations to the implementation of a regulatory budget and possibly review of the regulations issued by independent agencies.
Increased OIRA Staffing is the Prerequisite for Real, Lasting Regulatory Reform
From: National Affairs
Regulation Beyond Structure and Process
Reagan’s staff publicly downplayed its inheritance. But Jim Miller, the former CWPS analyst who became OIRA’s first chief, privately wrote to OMB deputy director Ed Harper that “[o]ur program will build on the successes of the accounting and paperwork reduction programs,” adding that it could now, “for the first time, make real changes in the substance” of regulations. If they found such success, it would be because “when Reagan issued the executive order, we had an infrastructure, which is very important,” as Tozzi later said: “[W]e had a system in place.” Indeed, despite OMB’s embrace of the Paperwork Reduction Act generally, the office viewed OIRA as unnecessary: Under Carter, the agency had already reorganized twice around regulatory and paperwork tasks, and by 1980 it boasted a 45-person Office of Regulatory and Information Policy.