Archive for October, 2015
From: American Action Forum
By Sam Batkins
The American Action Forum (AAF) has spent considerable time outlining the efficacy, potential benefits, and international perspectives behind a budget for federal regulation. Now, Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK) has sponsored the “RED Tape Act of 2015” (S. 1944), which aims to install a British-style “one-in, one-out” method for regulatory accounting.
What does it mean to be an “excellent” regulator? What qualities does regulatory excellence require? How is such excellence measured? And how can a regulator achieve the goal of regulatory excellence?
A new report, issued today by Penn Law professor Cary Coglianese for the Penn Program on Regulation’s Best-in-Class Regulator Initiative, answers these questions. The report culminates the Initiative’s efforts to define “regulatory excellence.” The project, commissioned by the Alberta Energy Regulator and led by Coglianese, incorporated papers from a wide range of scholars and multiple dialogues held both in Alberta and Philadelphia.
The publication of the Carter Regulatory Budget resulted in a number of subsequent actions by one or more Presidents.
Jeff Rosen states:
C. George H.W. Bush Administration Regulatory Budgeting Proposals
Editor’s Note: See CRE’s 2002 Blueprint for OMB Review of Independent Agency Regulations here.
From: Truth on the Market
Last June, in Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court commendably recognized cost-benefit analysis as critical to any reasoned evaluation of regulatory proposals by federal agencies. (For more on the merits and limitations of this holding, see my June 29 blog.) The White House (Office of Management and Budget) office that evaluates proposed federal regulations, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), does not, however, currently assess independent agencies’ regulations (the Heritage Foundation has argued that independent agencies should be subjected to Executive Branch regulatory review). This is most unfortunate, because the economic impact of independent agencies’ regulations (such as those promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, among many other “independent” entities) is enormous.
From: Northwestern Law Review
Cass Sunstein is the leading advocate of “nudges”—small policy interventions that yield major impacts because of behavioral quirks in the way that people process information. Such interventions form the core of Sunstein’s philosophy of “libertarian paternalism,” which seeks to improve on individuals’ decisions while preserving their freedom to choose. In Why Nudge?, Sunstein forcefully defends libertarian paternalism against John Stuart Mill’s famous Harm Principle, which holds that government should only coerce a person when it is acting to prevent harm to others. Sunstein urges that, unlike more coercive measures, nudges respect subjects’ goals, even as they reshape their choices. Using an analogy to voting paradoxes, this Review shows that reconciling multiple, inconsistent goals is a fundamentally challenging problem that leaves even deliberative individuals vulnerable to manipulation through nudges. The fact of inconsistent goals means that government regulators who deploy nudges select and impose their own objectives, instead of merely advancing the goals of the regulated. The analogy also highlights that multimember legislative bodies are subject to many of the same quirks as individuals, raising questions about the government’s ability to improve on individuals’ choices.
I strongly support the idea of a regulatory budget, but it needs to be carefully designed and implemented. As I will explain later in my testimony, we already have the functional equivalent of a regulatory budget in the form of Executive Orders issued by Presidents of both parties that are implemented by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). That regulatory budget is well-designed and well-implemented.
Reeve T. Bull – Research Chief, Administrative Conference of the United States; Co-Chair of ABA Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice Section E-Rulemaking Committee
Over three decades ago, the United States was at the forefront of developed nations in creating a centralized system for regulatory review and rationalizing regulatory policymaking through the use of benefit-cost analysis.
In the ensuing thirty years, the United States’ system for executive review has changed very little, notwithstanding some minor readjustments. . In that same time period, other developed nations have enacted significant regulatory reforms, some of which involve copying the American framework but many of which represent new innovations that go well beyond what the United States has adopted.