Archive for February, 2019
From: Chicago Booth Review
The longstanding debate about government oversight is giving way to a new understanding of how to craft more effective industry rules
But in 1962, Stigler threw a wrench into this traditional way of thinking. In a groundbreaking paper on electricity prices, where the sellers were monopolies, he demonstrated that government regulation hadn’t lowered electricity prices as much as expected. If regulation didn’t work to bring prices toward marginal costs in a monopoly, what kind of effect was it having in other situations? Were government regulations at all effective in correcting private-market failures?
Editor’s Note: Originally posted on Regulatory Pacesetters.
From: Notice & Comment | A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice
by Jim Tozzi
After a number of weekends the Editor has finished reading a very informative book written by a score of talented scholars and edited by Professor Parrillo of Yale University on the works of an administrative law legend, Professor Mashaw.
Selfishly we often read articles from the perspective of issues we are working on, in this instance centralized regulatory review and the Data Quality Act.
From: CATO at Liberty
By Derek Bonett
In comes Daniel Walters, a Regulatory Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania law school. His most recent law review article empirically tests the above hypothesis: that agencies will promulgate vaguer rules in the aftermath of the Auer case than before. He finds that this is not the case, and – using an empirical approach to the study of law that ought to be much more popular – cannot dismiss the null hypothesis that there is no change in the measured vagueness of federal regulations before and after Auer. In this blog post, I would like to highlight a major shortcoming of Professor Walter’s otherwise commendable methodological effort.
Trnka, D. and Y. Thuerer (2019), “One-In, X-Out: Regulatory
offsetting in selected OECD countries ”, OECD Regulatory
Policy Working Papers, No. 11, OECD Publishing, Paris.
From: The Regulatory Review
Over the last two years, OIRA has made many positive contributions to the administrative state.
From 1981 through 2017, staffing numbers at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) declined steadily. That trend was reversed in 2018. OIRA’s need for additional staff reflected the diverse projects it has undertaken over the last two years. These projects have involved improving the accuracy of the Unified Agenda, working with the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), and implementing the first regulatory budget, a regulatory reform idea that had been pioneered by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1979.