[Editor’s Note: This is Jim Tozzi’s review of Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 Yale Law Journal 2182 (2016), which originally appeared here. Jim Tozzi served as a career regulatory official in five consecutive Administrations and was instrumental in the establishment of centralized regulatory review.]
From: D-Lib Magazine
Ge Peng1, Nancy A. Ritchey2, Kenneth S. Casey2, Edward J. Kearns2, Jeffrey L. Privette2, Drew Saunders2, Philip Jones3, Tom Maycock1, and Steve Ansari2
Publisher’s Note: Centralized regulatory review began on the “budget side” of OMB in the form of the Quality of Life Review. From the onset probably the single biggest opposition to OMB assuming its new role were career budget examiners who stated regulatory review was very political and it would eventually set the stage for an intrusive oversight of the budget process.
Well It took forty five years but they were correct as witnessed by the recommendations in the following article. Consequently the author of the following article is to be complimented not only for educating the public of the very important and far reaching impacts of the “budget side” of OMB but also for setting the stage for disclosing an observation that few scholars of centralized regulatory review appreciate.
From: arXiv.org
Mia Costa, Bruce A. Desmarais, and John A. Hird
From: Harvard Law Review
From: RegBlog | Penn Program on Regulation
In United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., the Supreme Court held that a “jurisdictional determination” issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was final agency action subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The fact that the Supreme Court’s decision was both unanimous and yet also yielded four separate opinions hints at the interesting and important administrative law issues that lurk in the details.
Editor’s Note: See, A Website Dedicated to the Implementation of a Regulatory Budget.
From: Competitive Enterprise Institute
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The concept of budgeting is not new, nor partisan. Democratic Texas Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, who served as Treasury Secretary in the Clinton Administration, proposed in the 1979 Disco era an “an annual cap on the compliance costs each agency could impose on the private sector” plus “coordinat[ing] the regulatory and fiscal budgets.” That’s important when considering dynamic scoring, and recognizing regulations affect macroeconomic variables.
Regulatory budgeting was also considered in President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 Economic Report of the President.
From: American Action Forum
Douglas Holtz-Eakin
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OIRA has played a critical role in managing the nation’s regulatory apparatus for more than a generation. Although critiques of the agency are justified, mainly on transparency grounds, its status as a gatekeeper for federal regulation is vital. Unfortunately, its output during this administration will have profound implications for the American economy. These implications may not show up in national unemployment numbers, but in the wages of hundreds of industries, and in the prices paid by millions of Americans.
From: Notice & Comment
by Daniel Hemel
My co-blogger Andy Grewal asked in a post on Tuesday: “Why doesn’t the IRS comply with the Congressional Review Act?” My first thought on reading Andy’s post was: “Yeah, why doesn’t it?” My second thought was: “Maybe it does.”
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From: RegBlog | Penn Program on Regulation
Until recently, the term regulatory capture seemed stale, a mid-20th century academic construct incapable of describing the latest manifestations of special interest influence. At the opportune time, new empirical work by academics, featured in Daniel Carpenter’s and David Moss’s book Preventing Regulatory Capture, refines the concept to discern and measure capture more accurately, and, in that matter, engender plausible, contextual solutions. Many of the novel forms capture now takes and the projected remedies, are covered in the essays in this RegBlog series. At this point, a brief history of the concept of capture, in particular its antecedents in political thought, may inform, if not entertain.
