Deregulation, Reagan-Style

From: The Regulatory Review

Presidents Reagan and Trump differ on approaches to social and economic regulation.

History can help explain the politics of regulation, but only if we first understand that there are different kinds of regulation out there. For example, one might usefully—if imperfectly—distinguish economic regulation—that is, the intensive regulation of specific industries in ways that often manage the supply or price of certain goods or both—from social regulation—that is, the protection of the public from general social harms, such as pollution or unsafe workplaces.

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Regulatory Reforms and Counter-Reformations

From: The Regulatory Review

Some of President Trump’s deregulatory actions are innovations, others build on his predecessors’ work.

To be sure, the Trump Administration has continued the slow refinement and modernization of cost-benefit analysis. But by and large, the work of OIRA reflects the work of the Reagan Administration, the Clinton Administration, and the rest. The Reagan Administration’s formal codification and extension of practices that had arisen organically from the Nixon Administration onward succeeded in entrenching OIRA as a major institution of governance, and the Trump Administration is simply the latest Administration to maintain its inheritance.

Benefit-Cost Analyses and the Regulatory Budget

From: Notice & Comment | A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice

by Jim Tozzi

Arguments are frequently made to the effect that if the benefits of a regulation exceed its costs, the regulation should promulgated. Here is a succinct statement as to why the aforementioned statement is flawed.

A Brief History of Regulation and Deregulation

From: The Regulatory Review

The history of regulatory policy in the United States is rich, but its future remains unclear.

Ever since Congress created the first federal regulatory body more than 130 years ago, people have debated the proper role for what has been called the “fourth branch” of government. This essay provides a brief history of regulation and deregulation, reviewing the key milestones that have shaped regulatory practices in the United States from the mid-1900s to the presidency of Donald J. Trump.

Why less regulation isn’t necessarily better

From: Chicago Booth Review

The longstanding debate about government oversight is giving way to a new understanding of how to craft more effective industry rules

BRIAN WALLHEIMER

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But in 1962, Stigler threw a wrench into this traditional way of thinking. In a groundbreaking paper on electricity prices, where the sellers were monopolies, he demonstrated that government regulation hadn’t lowered electricity prices as much as expected. If regulation didn’t work to bring prices toward marginal costs in a monopoly, what kind of effect was it having in other situations? Were government regulations at all effective in correcting private-market failures?

A Comment on Administrative Law from the Inside Out—Essays on Themes in the Work of Jerry L. Mashaw

Editor’s Note: Originally posted on Regulatory Pacesetters.

From: Notice & Comment | A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice

by Jim Tozzi

After a number of weekends the Editor has finished reading a very informative book written by a score of talented scholars and edited by Professor Parrillo of Yale University on the works of an administrative law legend, Professor Mashaw.

Selfishly we often read articles from the perspective of issues we are working on, in this instance centralized regulatory review and the Data Quality Act.

Testing the Effects of Auer Deference

From: CATO at Liberty

By Derek Bonett

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In comes Daniel Walters, a Regulatory Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania law school. His most recent law review article empirically tests the above hypothesis: that agencies will promulgate vaguer rules in the aftermath of the Auer case than before. He finds that this is not the case, and – using an empirical approach to the study of law that ought to be much more popular – cannot dismiss the null hypothesis that there is no change in the measured vagueness of federal regulations before and after Auer. In this blog post, I would like to highlight a major shortcoming of Professor Walter’s otherwise commendable methodological effort.

One-In, X-Out: Regulatory offsetting in selected OECD countries

From: OECD

Trnka, D. and Y. Thuerer (2019), “One-In, X-Out: Regulatory
offsetting in selected OECD countries ”, OECD Regulatory
Policy Working Papers, No. 11, OECD Publishing, Paris.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/67d71764-en

 

OIRA Reinvigorated

From: The Regulatory Review

Over the last two years, OIRA has made many positive contributions to the administrative state.

From 1981 through 2017, staffing numbers at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) declined steadily. That trend was reversed in 2018. OIRA’s need for additional staff reflected the diverse projects it has undertaken over the last two years. These projects have involved improving the accuracy of the Unified Agenda, working with the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), and implementing the first regulatory budget, a regulatory reform idea that had been pioneered by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1979.

D.C. Circuit Review – Reviewed: The Use of Philosophers by the D.C. Circuit

From: Notice & Comment | A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice

by Aaron Nielson

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Much of Professor Rao’s scholarship focuses on administrative law — which no doubt will be discussed during her confirmation hearing. That scholarship, for what it is worth, is “well regarded” by folks from different ideological perspectives. As a law student, however, she published an interesting article about something very different: philosophers. Here at Notice & Comment, we like to help students find note ideas. In that spirit, I thought it would be fun to revisit her student note, A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of Philosophers by the Supreme Court.