The OIRA Module: Published Research

From: Indiana University/School of Public and Environmental Affairs

Sanya Carley, Denvil Duncan, John D. Graham, Saba Siddiki, and Nikolaos Zirogiannis

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study examines how the U.S. economy is likely to be impacted by the combined effects of three automotive regulatory programs that were adopted in 2012: the U.S. Department of Transportation’s corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for model years 2017-2025; the Environmental Protection Agency’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards for model years 2017-2025; and the California Air Resources Board’s Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) requirements for 2018-2025.

From: SSRN

From: The Economist | Grudges and kludges

Too much federal regulation has piled up in America

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When a government agency writes a significant regulation—mostly defined as one costing more than $100m—it must usually prove that the rule’s benefits justify its costs. Its analysis goes through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a nerdy outpost of the White House. The process is meticulous. The OECD, a club of mostly rich countries, finds that America’s analysis of regulations is among the most rigorous anywhere.

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From: Notice & Comment, A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice

by Chris Walker

Last March the Missouri Law Review hosted a terrific symposium, organized by Professor Erin Morrow Hawley, entitled A Future Without the Administrative State? (video here). The published issue from the symposium was just posted to the Law Review‘s website. I tweeted out thread of summaries/links to each piece here. Professor Hawley’s introduction is definitely a great place to start.

Here is the table of contents, with links to each article:

Read Complete Article

Editor’s Note: To learn more about regulatory budgets, read Towards a Regulatory Budget: A Working Paper on the Cost of Federal Regulation (1979).

From: Notice & Comment | A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice

by John Cooney

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From: RegBlog | Penn Program on Regulation

Joseph P. Mohorovic

When conducting the analysis needed to inform sound regulatory decision-making, independent agencies could benefit from following key analytical standards that over the years have been imposed on executive branch agencies by executive orders. As a Commissioner of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), too often I have seen my Agency depart from these analytical best practices, which then can lead to misinformed and even unnecessary regulations. Regulatory decision-making at independent agencies like CPSC would benefit from adherence to four main analytic requirements contained in executive orders.

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From: RegBlog | Penn Program on Regulation

Joseph P. Mohorovic

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First, independent agencies like CPSC should be expected to improve the accuracy and timeliness of their regulatory agendas. The regulatory agenda concept began with Executive Order 12,044, issued by President Jimmy Carter in 1978. Its plainly stated purpose was “to give the public adequate notice” of how agencies would be spending their time in the near term, which would allow for and encourage meaningful public participation in the regulatory process. The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) extended the regulatory agenda requirement to all agencies, including independent agencies.

From: Notice & Comment | A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice

by Emily Bremer

Over the last several weeks, we have hosted an online symposium on the 2016 Report to the President-Elect on Improving the Administrative Process, which was released by the ABA Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice in advance of the presidential election. The symposium has generated a robust, diverse discussion of many of the recommendations included in the Report.

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From: Notice & Comment | A Blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice

by Neomi Rao

The gap between textbook administrative law and actual practice exists in many areas, but perhaps nowhere more so than with respect to the so-called independent agencies. In theory, such agencies operate “independent” of the control and direction of the President. In practice, the White House has myriad mechanisms to oversee and even to control these agencies. One practical area in which the separation remains is regulatory review—no President has extended direct regulatory oversight to independent agencies.

From: The Wall Street Journal

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The Reagan White House met this challenge by setting up a special task force to run regulatory policy for the first months of 1981. It was led by then-Vice President George H.W. Bush, with a big assist from his general counsel Boyden Gray. Key staff included such policy legends as Jim Miller, who later ran the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and White House budget office; Frank Blake, who would go on to run Home Depot,  Jim Tozzi, who would become the ranking career official in the White House regulatory shop; Tim Muris, who ran the FTC under George W. Bush; and Jeffrey Eisenach, now with the American Enterprise Institute.