Social Entrepreneurs and the Management of the Regulatory State, The Latent Need to Update Law School Curricula

From: CRE Presentation to the The Southeastern Association of Law Schools | 2017 SEALS Annual Conference Boca Raton, Florida

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Implications for Centralized Regulatory Review

It is the view of CRE that if the federal regulatory process were pro-active in terms of social entrepreneurs providing ingenious solutions to regulatory issues there would be less incentive for politicians to resort to Draconian measures to correct a tilt in the regulatory state. The strong presence of social entrepreneurs would also lead to the formation of a national constituency for OIRA which would shelter it in part from interest group demands for ideological solutions to regulatory issues.

Social Security Numbers: OMB Actions Needed to Strengthen Federal Efforts to Limit Identity Theft Risks by Reducing Collection, Use, and Display

From: US Government Accountability Office | Report to the Chairman; Subcommittee on Social Security Committee on Ways and Means; House of Representatives

Presidential Regulatory Authority: Two Views

Editor’s Note: Despite the definitive U.S. Court of Appeals ruling in Sierra Club v. Costle, the legitimacy of Presidential authority over the review and approval of federal regulations has been a contentious issue since the process was established by then OMB Director George Schultz during the Nixon Administration. The contemporary scholarly debate on centralized regulatory review has been enhanced by the two recent publications, (1) an Administrative Law Review article by Professor Ming H. Chen, “Administrator-In-Chief: President and Executive Action in Immigration Law” available here and (2) CRE’s response, below.

 

Response to Professor Chen on “The Administrator-in-Chief”

Re: Professor Chen article in the Administrative Law Review

An Empirical Analysis of the Establishment of Independent Agencies

From: The Regulatory Review

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In our recent article, The Genesis of Independent Agencies, we ask a core question of administrative law: When are agencies established with features that insulate them from direct presidential control? The leading articles in the legal literature assert that Congress is more likely to establish independent agencies when government is divided—that is, when the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, or both are controlled by a different party than that of the President. Under these circumstances, the academic literature maintains, Congress is less willing to give the President fuller control of a new agency. Only a single political science study—one that suffers from design flaws and that has been misinterpreted in the legal literature—provides empirical evidence for the claim that divided government has an impact on the establishment of independent agencies.

The Case for the Administrative State

Editor’s Note: Please see, Paul Verkuil and the Case for Professional Government, here and here.

From: Real Clear Policy

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Bucking this line of argument, Paul Verkuil of the Center for American Progress makes a positive case for the administrative state. A former law professor and chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States from 2010–2015, Verkuil is hardly insensitive to the constitutional issues surrounding administrative law or the many problems and inefficiencies that plague our federal bureaucracy. He insists, however, that the administrative state is the solution, not the problem.

Working Smart and Hard? Agency Effort, Judicial Review, and Policy Precision

From: Journal of Theoretical Politics 29(1): 69-96.

Ian R. Turner, Texas A&M University – Department of Political Science

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The Administrative State Has Run Amok

From: The Regulatory Review | A Publication of the Penn Program on Regulation

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In my original essay, I encouraged the use of four regulatory best practices that, among others, could improve the regulatory work product from CPSC and agencies across the federal government. These included:

  1. Requiring honesty from agencies in their regulatory agendas, so that those who are not Washington insiders are not forced to comb through obscure agency documents to know how their tax dollars are being spent.

Regulatory Analysis Requirements Reduce Political Influence

From: Regulation and Governance

Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Neal D. Woods

Abstract

Well-known theories suggest that administrative procedures may be used as mechanisms of political control of the bureaucracy. This study investigates whether three common regulatory analysis procedures—cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, and economic impact analysis—lead to greater influence by political officials on bureaucratic policymaking. Multivariate analyses of data from a unique survey of state administrators indicate that regulatory analysis requirements are associated with decreases in the perceived influence of elected political officials on the content of administrative rules. This association is particularly evident in cases where proposed rules are subjected to a cost–benefit test. These findings contradict prominent theories of administrative procedures, but are consistent with recent research on the political power of administrative agencies.

Sticky Regulations

From: SSRN

53 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2017

Aaron Nielson

Brigham Young University – J. Reuben Clark Law School

Abstract

Administrative law is often said to present a dilemma. On one hand, all three branches of the federal government have crafted procedures to facilitate public participation in the regulatory process and to ensure that the benefits of regulations outweigh their costs. But on the other hand, such procedures have a price — they delay administrative action and sometimes thwart it altogether. In fact, marching under the banner of “ossification,” an entire literature has formed around the idea that there are too many procedures and that administrative law should be transformed to speed up the regulatory process.

The OIRA Hall of Fame Library: Introductions By Political Scientists, Historians, Economists and Sociologists

  

 Three Controlling Disciplines  

 

                                                                          June 2017

This publication is the first time in the nearly half century of centralized regulatory review that the treatises, Archives, Reference Library, Histories and continuous updates thereto (OIRA Hall of Fame Library) that lead its creation have been  made available in one location. These work products are being made available to researchers at no cost in order to provide a platform for their informing the American public of the impact that centralized regulator review has on their daily activities. Hopefully current visitors to this website including Congressional and judicial staff, members of the press, federal regulators and a wide range of academic scholars will continue to benefit from the material presented herein.  Researchers are invited to visit the OIRA Reference Library which contains thousands of pages of source material on OIRA which is updated daily by CRE staff.