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Executive Summary

The US Federal Government spends approximately $80 billion dollars on Information Technology (IT) annually\(^1\). However, a significant portion of this spending goes towards maintaining aging and duplicative infrastructure. Instead of highly efficient IT assets enabling agencies to deliver mission services, much of this spending is characterized by low asset utilization, long lead times to acquire new services, and fragmented demand. To compound this problem, Federal agencies are being asked to do more with less while maintaining a high level of service to the American public.

Cloud computing presents the Federal Government with an opportunity to transform its IT portfolio by giving agencies the ability to purchase a broad range of IT services in a utility-based model. This allows agencies to refocus their efforts on IT operational expenditures and only pay for IT services consumed instead of buying IT with a focus on capacity. Procuring IT services in a cloud computing model can help the Federal Government to increase operational efficiencies, resource utilization, and innovation across its IT portfolio, delivering a higher return on our investments to the American taxpayer.

In order to leverage the power of cloud computing across the Federal Government’s IT portfolio, the Administration established a “Cloud First” policy in the 25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology published in December of 2010\(^2\). Under this policy, Federal agencies are required to “default to cloud-based solutions whenever a secure, reliable, cost-effective cloud option exists.”

Subsequent to the publication of the 25 Point Plan, the Administration published the Federal Cloud Computing Strategy in February of 2011\(^3\). This document represented the first step in providing guidance to Federal agencies on successfully implementing the “Cloud First” policy and catalyzing more rapid adoption of cloud computing services across the Federal IT landscape.

Additionally, in December of 2011, the Federal Chief Information Officer released a new policy, Security Authorization of Information Systems in Cloud Computing Environments, detailing the new Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP). FedRAMP provides Federal agencies with a unified way to secure cloud computing services through the use of a standardized baseline set of security controls for authorizing cloud systems. This standard approach to securing cloud computing systems works in concert with the elements detailed in this paper to create a solid foundation of transparent standards and processes the government should use when buying cloud computing systems.

\(^1\) http://www.itdashboard.gov.  
The adoption of cloud computing across the Federal IT portfolio represents a dramatic shift in the way Federal agencies buy IT—a shift from periodic capital expenditures to lower cost and predictable operating expenditures. With this shift comes a learning curve within government regarding the effective procurement of cloud-based services. Simultaneously, this move has created a burgeoning market in which private industry can provide these cloud-based services to the Federal Government.

This paper is the next step in providing Federal agencies more specific guidance in effectively implementing the “Cloud First” policy and moving forward with the “Federal Cloud Computing Strategy” by focusing on ways to more effectively procure cloud services within existing regulations and laws. Since the Federal Government holds the position as the single largest purchaser in this new market, Federal agencies have a unique opportunity to shape the way that cloud computing services are purchased and consumed.

The design, procurement, and use of cloud computing services involve unique and different equities within a Federal agency. Proactive planning with all necessary agency stakeholders (e.g. chief information officers (CIO), general counsels, privacy officers, records managers, e-discovery counsel, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) officers, and procurement staff), is essential when evaluating and procuring cloud computing services.

In developing this paper, we reached out to working groups under the Office of Management and Budget, Federal CIO Council (Information Security and Identity Management Committee (ISIMC), Cloud Computing Executive Steering Committee, etc.), procurement specialists who have issued Federal cloud computing services implementations, and other related experts (IT security, privacy, general counsel’s office, etc.) both internal and external to the Federal Government. This paper brings together these collective inputs to highlight unique contracting requirements related to cloud computing contracts that will allow Federal agencies to effectively and safely procure cloud services for agency consumption.

By highlighting the areas in which cloud computing presents unique requirements compared to the traditional IT contracts, this paper will help to continue the forward momentum the Federal Government has made in adopting cloud computing. By understanding these unique requirements and following the proposed recommendations, agencies can implement cloud computing contracts that deliver better outcomes for the American people at a lower cost.

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4 We would like to express our appreciation to Scott Renda, Matthew Goodrich, Allison Stanton, Jonathan Cantor, Jodi Cramer, and the Federal Cloud Compliance Committee for their tremendous efforts in helping to develop this paper.

5 This paper is not intended to be the definitive source for guidance on cloud services contracts for Federal agencies. Instead it is meant to be guidance developed from the best practices across government and industry for agencies to use when entering the procurement process.
Introduction

As a result of the Administration’s goal to accelerate the adoption of cloud computing, Federal agencies are increasingly migrating systems of growing importance to the cloud. As agencies embrace this “Cloud First” policy, there are lessons to be learned and best practices to be shared from early adopters.

The most consistent lessons learned from the early adopters show that the Federal Government needs to buy, view, and think about IT differently. Cloud computing presents a paradigm shift that is larger than IT, and while there are technology changes with cloud services, the more substantive issues that need to be addressed lie in the business and contracting models applicable to cloud services. This new paradigm requires agencies to re-think not only the way they acquire IT services in the context of deployment, but also how the IT services they consume provide mission and support functions on a shared basis. Federal agencies should begin to design and/or select solutions that allow for purchasing based on consumption in the shared model that cloud-based architectures provide.

Cloud computing allows consumers to buy IT in a new, consumption-based model. Given the dynamic nature of taxpayer needs, the traditional method of acquiring IT has become less effective in ensuring the Federal Government effectively covers all of its requirements. By moving from purchasing IT in a way that requires capital expenditures and overhead, and instead purchasing IT “on-demand” as an agency consumes services, unique requirements have arisen that Federal agencies need to address when contracting with cloud service providers (CSPs).

At this point in time, the following ten areas require improved collaboration and alignment during the contract formation process by agency program, CIO, general counsel, privacy and procurement offices when acquiring cloud computing services:  

- **Selecting a Cloud Service**: Choosing the appropriate cloud service and deployment model is the critical first step in procuring cloud services;
- **CSP and End-User Agreements**: Terms of Service and all CSP/customer required agreements need to be integrated fully into cloud contracts;
- **Service Level Agreements (SLAs)**: SLAs need to define performance with clear terms and definitions, demonstrate how performance is being measured, and what enforcement mechanisms are in place to ensure SLAs are met;

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6 Federal agencies must ensure cloud environments are compliant with all existing laws and regulations when they move IT services to the cloud. This paper focuses on a number of requirements that require a special analysis when acquiring cloud services. The paper does not address other procurement and acquisition requirements, such as but not limited to compliance with Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or confidential statistical information (as protected by the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002 or similar statutes that protect the confidentiality of information collected solely for statistical purposes under a pledge of confidentiality).
- **CSP, Agency, and Integrator Roles and Responsibilities**: Careful delineation between the responsibilities and relationships among the Federal agency, integrators, and the CSP are needed in order to effectively manage cloud services;
- **Standards**: The use of the NIST cloud reference architecture as well as agency involvement in standards are necessary for cloud procurements;
- **Security**: Agencies must clearly detail the requirements for CSPs to maintain the security and integrity of data existing in a cloud environment;
- **Privacy**: If cloud services host “privacy data,” agencies must adequately identify potential privacy risks and responsibilities and address these needs in the contract;
- **E-Discovery**: Federal agencies must ensure that all data stored in a CSP environment is available for legal discovery by allowing all data to be located, preserved, collected, processed, reviewed, and produced;
- **Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)**: Federal agencies must ensure that all data stored in a CSP environment is available for appropriate handling under the FOIA; and
- **E-Records**: Agencies must ensure CSP’s understand and assist Federal agencies in compliance with the Federal Records Act (FRA) and obligations under this law.

These ten unique areas of focus are not an exhaustive list of unique issues with cloud computing. Through government working groups under the OMB, the Federal CIO Council, reviews of existing cloud contracts, reviewing industry and academia papers and studies, and speaking with procurement and legal experts across the Federal Government, these ten areas were identified as requiring the most attention at this time. By addressing these unique areas to cloud computing in addition to traditional contracting best practices and bringing the relevant stakeholders together proactively, Federal agencies will be able to more effectively procure and manage IT as a service.
Selecting a Cloud Service

The primary driver behind purchasing any new IT service is to effectively meet a commodity, support, or mission requirement that the agency has. Part of the analysis of that need or problem is determining the appropriate solution. When the solution involves technology, the Administration’s “Cloud First” and “Shared First” policies dictate that an agency must default to using a cloud computing solution if a safe and secure one exists. However, choosing the cloud is only the first step in this analysis. It is also critical for Federal agencies to decide which cloud service and deployment model best meets their needs.

Infrastructure, Platform, or Software-as-a-Service

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has defined three cloud computing service models: Infrastructure as a Service, Platform as a Service, and Software as a Service\(^7\). These service models can be summarized as:

- **Infrastructure**: the provision of processing, storage, networking and other fundamental computing resources;
- **Platform**: the deployment of applications created using programming languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by a cloud provider; and
- **Software**: the use of applications running on a cloud infrastructure environment.

Each service model offers unique functionality depending on the class of user, with control of the environment decreasing as you move from Infrastructure to Platform to Software. Infrastructure is most suitable for users like network administrators as agencies can place unique platforms and software on the infrastructure being consumed. Platform is most suitable for users like server or system administrators in development and deployment activities. Software is most appropriate for end users since all functionalities are usually offered out of the box. Understanding the degree of functionality and what users in an agency will consume the services is critical for Federal agencies in determining the appropriate cloud service to procure.

Private, Public, Community, or Hybrid Deployment Models

NIST has also defined four deployment models for cloud services: Private, Public, Community, and Hybrid\(^8\). These service deployments can be summarized as:

- **Private**: For use by a single organization;
- **Public**: For use by general public;
- **Community**: For use by a specific community of organizations with a shared purpose; and
- **Hybrid**: A composition of two or more cloud infrastructures (public, private, community).

These deployment models determine the number of consumers (multi-tenancy), and the nature of other consumers’ data that may be present in a cloud environment. A public cloud does not

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\(^7\) See NIST Special Publication 800-145.
\(^8\) Id.
allow a consumer to know or control who the other consumers of a cloud service provider’s environment are. However, a private cloud can allow for ultimate control in selecting who has access to a cloud environment. Community clouds and Hybrid clouds allow for a mixed degree of control and knowledge of other consumers. Additionally, the cost for cloud services typically increases as the control over other consumers and knowledge of these consumers increases. When consuming cloud services, it is important for Federal agencies to understand what type of government data they will be placing in the environment, and select the deployment type that corresponds to the appropriate level of control and data sensitivity.

To choose a cloud service that will properly meet a unique need, it is vital to first determine the proper level of service and deployment. Federal agencies should endeavor to understand not only what functionality they will receive when using a cloud service, but also how the deployment model a cloud service utilizes will affect the environment in which government data is placed.

**CSP and End-User Agreements**

CSPs enforce common acceptable use standards across all users to effectively maintain how a consumer uses a CSP environment. Thus, use of a CSP environment usually requires Federal agency end-users to sign Terms of Service Agreements (TOS). Additionally, Federal agencies can also require CSPs to sign Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) to enforce acceptable CSP personnel behavior when dealing with Federal data. TOS and NDAs need to be fully contemplated and agreed upon by both CSPs and Federal agencies to ensure that all parties fully understand the breadth and scope of their duties when using cloud services. These agreements are new to many IT contracts because of the nature of the interaction of end-users with CSP environments – both due to Federal agency access to cloud services through CSP interfaces and CSP personnel access and control of Federal data.

**Terms of Service Agreements**

Federal agencies need to know if a CSP requires an end-user to agree to TOS in order to use the CSP’s services prior to signing a contract. TOS restrict the ways Federal agency consumers can use CSP environments. They include provisions that detail how end-users may use the services, responsibilities of the CSP, and how the CSP will deal with customer data. Provisions within a TOS may contradict unique aspects of Federal law that apply only to agencies as well as the terms of the contract between a Federal agency and a CSP. Given that, Federal agencies are advised to work with CSPs to understand what they require in order for Federal agency end-users to access a CSP environment and at the same time ensure that any TOS document incorporated into the contract is acceptable to the Federal agency. If the TOS are not directly within the contract but referenced within the contract, the TOS should be negotiated and agreed upon prior to contract award.

Additionally, TOS sometimes include provisions relating to CSP responsibilities, controlling law, indemnification and other issues that are more appropriate for the terms and conditions of the
contract. If these provisions are included within service agreements, they should be clearly defined. Furthermore, any agreements must address time requirements that a CSP will need to follow to comply with Federal agency rules and regulations\(^9\). Any contract provisions regarding controlling law, jurisdiction, and indemnification arising out of a Federal agency's use of a CSP environment must align with Federal statutes, policies, and regulations; and compliance should be defined before a contract award. This may be done through a separate document or be included in the actual contract.

**Non-Disclosure Agreements**
Federal agencies often require CSP personnel to sign NDAs when dealing with Federal data. These are usually requested by Federal agencies in order to ensure that CSP personnel protect non-public information that is procurement-sensitive, or affects pre-decisional policy, physical security, etc. Federal agencies will need to consider the requirements and enforceability of NDAs with CSP personnel. The acceptable behavior prescribed by NDAs requires Federal agency oversight, including examining the NDAs' requirements in the rules of behavior and monitoring of end-users activities in the cloud environment. Federal agencies should ensure that they do not overlook such provisions when creating NDAs. CSP and end-user agreements such as TOS and NDAs are important to both Federal agencies and CSPs in order to clearly define the acceptable behavior by end-users and CSP personnel when using cloud services. These agreements should be fully contemplated by both CSPs and Federal agencies prior to cloud services being procured. All such agreements should be incorporated, either by full text or by reference, into the CSP contract in order to avoid the usually costly and time-consuming process of negotiating these agreements after the enactment of a cloud computing contract.

**Service Level Agreements**
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) are agreements under the umbrella of the overall cloud computing contract between a CSP and a Federal agency. SLAs define acceptable service levels to be provided by the CSP to its customers in measurable terms. The ability of a CSP to perform at acceptable levels is consistent among SLAs, but the definition, measurement and enforcement of this performance varies widely among CSPs. Federal agencies should ensure that CSP performance is clearly specified in all SLAs, and that all such agreements are fully incorporated, either by full text or by reference, into the CSP contract.

**Terms and Definitions**
SLAs are necessary between a CSP and customer to contractually agree upon the acceptable service levels expected from a CSP. SLAs across CSPs have many common terms, but definitions and performance metrics can vary widely among vendors. For instance, CSPs can differ in their definition of uptime (one measure of reliability) by stating uptime is not met only when services are unavailable for periods exceeding one hour. To further complicate this, many CSPs define

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\(^9\) This includes statutory requirements and associated deadlines, such as those found under FISMA and FOIA, and applicable regulatory structures, such as those governing Inspector General (IG) investigations and audits.
availability (another measure of reliability sometimes used within the definition of uptime) in a way that may exclude CSP planned service outages. Federal agencies need to fully understand any ambiguities in the definitions of cloud computing terms in order to know what levels of service they can expect from a CSP.

**Measuring SLA Performance**

When Federal agencies place Federal data in a CSP environment, they are inherently giving up control over certain aspects of the services that they consume. As a best practice, SLAs should clearly define how performance is guaranteed (such as response time resolution/mitigation time, availability, etc.) and require CSPs to monitor their service levels, provide timely notification of a failure to meet the SLAs, and evidence that problems have been resolved or mitigated. SLA performance clauses should be consistent with the performance clauses within the contract. Agencies should enforce this by requiring in the reporting clauses of the SLA and the contract that CSPs submit reports or provide a dashboard where Federal agencies can continuously verify that service levels are being met. Without this provision, a Federal agency may not be able to measure CSP performance.

**SLA Enforcement Mechanisms**

Most standard SLAs provided by CSPs do not include provisions for penalties if an SLA is not met. The consequence to a customer if an SLA is not met can be catastrophic (unavailability during peak demand, for example). However, without a penalty for CSPs in the SLA, CSPs may not have sufficient incentives to meet the agreed-upon service levels. In order to incentivize CSPs to meet the contract terms, there should be a credible consequence (for example, a monetary or service credit) so that a failure to meet the agreed to terms creates an undesired business outcome for the CSP in addition to the customer.

With many of the high profile cases of cloud service provider failures relating to provisions covered by SLAs, as a best practice, Federal agencies need SLAs that provide value and can be enforced when a service level is not met. SLAs with clearly defined terms and definitions, performance metrics measured and guaranteed by CSPs, and enforcement mechanisms for meeting service levels, will provide value to Federal agencies and incentives for CSPs to meet the agreed upon terms.

**CSP, Agency, and Integrator Roles and Responsibilities**

Many Federal agencies procure cloud services through integrators. In these cases, integrators can provide a level of expertise within CSP environments which Federal agencies may not have, thus making a Federal agency’s transition to cloud services easier. Integrators may also provide a full range of services from technical support to help desk support that CSPs might not provide. When deciding to use an integrator, the Federal agency may procure services directly from a CSP and separately with an integrator, or it may procure cloud services through an integrator, for ease of discussion, “integrators” is being used as an umbrella term to include service providers such as system integrators, resellers, etc.
as the prime contractor and the CSP as subcontractor. Whichever method the Federal agency decides to use, the addition of an integrator to a cloud computing implementation creates contractual relationships with at least three unique parties, and the roles and responsibilities for all parties need to be clearly defined.

**Contracting with Integrators**

Integrators can be contracted independently of CSPs or can act as an intermediary with CSPs. This flexibility allows Federal agencies to choose the most effective method for contracting with integrators to help implement their cloud computing solutions. As a best practice, Federal agencies need to consider the technical abilities and overall service offerings of integrators and how these elements impact the overall pricing of an integrator’s proposed services. Additionally, if a Federal agency contracts with an integrator acting as an intermediary, the Federal agency must consider how this affects the Federal agency’s continued use of a CSP environment when the contract with an integrator ends.

**Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities**

Whether an agency contracts with an integrator independently or uses one as an intermediary, roles and responsibilities need to be clearly defined. Scenarios that need to be clearly defined within a cloud computing solution that incorporate an integrator include: how a Federal agency interacts with a CSP to manage the CSP environment, what access an integrator has to Federal data within a CSP environment, and what actions an integrator may take on behalf of a Federal agency. Failure to address the roles and responsibilities of each party can hinder the end-user’s ability to fully realize the benefits of cloud computing. For instance, if initiating a new instance of a virtual machine requires a Federal agency to interact with an integrator, then this interaction breaks the on-demand essential characteristic of cloud computing.

The introduction of integrators to cloud computing solutions can be a critical element of success for many Federal agencies. However, the introduction of an additional party to a cloud computing contract requires Federal agencies to fully consider the most effective method of contracting with an integrator and clearly define the roles and responsibilities among CSPs, Federal agencies, and integrators.

**Standards**

When Federal agencies procure cloud solutions, U.S. laws and associated policy require the use of international, voluntary consensus standards except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical. Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs) are continuing to develop conceptual models, reference architectures, and standards to facilitate communication, data exchange, and security for cloud computing applications. Standards are already available in support of many of the functions and requirements for cloud computing. While many of these

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11 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, as amended (TAA), the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119 Revised: Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities.
standards were developed in support of pre-cloud computing technologies, such as those designed for web services and the Internet, they also support the functions and requirements of cloud computing. Other standards are now being developed in specific support of cloud computing functions and requirements, such as virtualization.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publishes guidance and standards for agencies to follow when procuring cloud and other technologies, as well as roadmaps for agencies to understand the development of standards for future use. These publications address, for example, security, interoperability, and portability\(^{12}\). NIST Special Publication 500-291, NIST Cloud Computing Roadmap, presents these standards in the context of the NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture using the NIST taxonomy in NIST Special Publication 500-292, NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture.

When procuring cloud solutions, it is important for Federal agencies to understand:

1. How vendor solutions and agency roles map to the NIST Reference Architecture; and
2. The role of Federal agencies in the use of cloud computing standards.

**Reference Architecture**

Understanding the roles and responsibilities among all actors deploying a cloud solution is critical to successful implementations. The NIST Reference Architecture describes five major actors with their roles and responsibilities using the newly developed Cloud Computing Taxonomy. The five major participating actors are: (1) Cloud Consumer; (2) Cloud Provider; (3) Cloud Broker; (4) Cloud Auditor; and (5) Cloud Carrier\(^{13}\).

These core actors have key roles in the realm of cloud computing. For example, an agency or department normally functions as a Cloud Consumer that acquires and uses cloud products and services. The purveyor of products and services is the Cloud Provider\(^{14}\). A Cloud Broker may act as the intermediate between Cloud Consumer and Cloud Provider to help Consumers through the complexity of cloud service offerings and may also offer value-added cloud services. A Cloud Auditor provides a valuable function for the government by conducting the independent performance and security monitoring of cloud services. A Cloud Carrier is an organization who has the responsibility of transferring the data, akin to the power distributor for the electric grid. In order to fully delineate the roles and responsibilities of all parties in a cloud computing contract, Federal agencies should align all actors with NIST Reference Architecture.

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\(^{12}\) Special Publication 500-291, NIST Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap, lists relevant standards for security (see Table 5), interoperability (see Table 6), and portability (see Table 7).

\(^{13}\) For more information relating to the definitions and roles and responsibilities of the five major actors described above, please reference NIST Special Publication 500-292, NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture.

\(^{14}\) Because of the possible service offerings (Software, Platform or Infrastructure) allowed for by the Cloud Provider, the level of responsibilities related to some aspects of the scope of control, security, and configuration need to be re-evaluated when procuring cloud services.
Agency Roles in the Use of Cloud Computing Standards

There are several means by which agencies can ensure the availability of technically sound and timely standards to support their missions.

1. **Standards specification**: In accordance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, agencies should specify relevant voluntary consensus standards in their procurements. The NIST Standards.gov website includes a useful list of questions that agencies should consider before selecting standards for agency use.

2. **Standards requirements**: Federal agencies should contribute clear and comprehensive mission requirements to help support the definition of performance-based cloud computing standards by the private sector.

Federal agencies should request that cloud service providers categorize their services using the NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture. This can be accomplished by the vendor’s “mapping” of services to the reference architecture, and presenting this “mapping” along with the vendor’s customized marketing and technical information. The reference architecture mapping provides a common and consistent frame of reference to compare vendor offerings when evaluating and procuring cloud services.

**Internet Protocol v6**

In support of IPv6, the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council issued a final rule in December 2009 amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to require all new information technology acquisitions using Internet Protocol (IP) to include IPv6 requirements expressed using the USGv6 Profile and to require vendors to document their compliance with those requirements through the USGv6 Testing Program. Accordingly, agencies shall institute processes to include language in solicitations and contracts, where applicable.

**Security**

Placing agency data on an information system involves risk, so it is critical for Federal agencies to ensure that the IT environment in which they are storing and accessing data is secure. As such, all IT systems used by Federal agencies must meet the requirements of the Federal Information Security and Management Act (FISMA) and related agency-specific policies. FISMA requires that all systems undergo a formal security authorization which details the

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16 Agencies should participate in the cloud computing standards development process. Agency support for concurrent development of conformity and interoperability assessment schemes will help to accelerate the development and use of technically sound cloud computing standards and standards-based products, processes, and services.

implementation and continuous monitoring of security controls CSPs must maintain. After the CSP’s environment has gone through a security authorization, a Federal agency must review the risks posed by placing Federal data in that system, and if this risk level is acceptable, the agency may grant an authority to operate (ATO).

FedRAMP
On December 8, 2011, OMB released a policy memo addressing the security authorization process for cloud computing services. Specifically, this memo requires all Federal agencies to use the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) when procuring and subsequently authorizing cloud computing solutions. Specifically, each agency must:

1. Use FedRAMP when authorizing cloud services;
2. Use the FedRAMP process and security requirements as a baseline for authorizing cloud services;
3. Require CSPs to comply with FedRAMP security requirements;
4. Establish a continuous monitoring program for cloud services;
5. Ensure that maintenance of FedRAMP security authorization requirements is addressed contractually;
6. Require that CSPs route their traffic through a Trusted Internet Connection (TIC); and
7. Provide an annual list of all systems that do not meet FedRAMP requirements to OMB.

FedRAMP will assist agencies to acquire, authorize and consume cloud services by adequately addressing security from a baseline perspective. FedRAMP will allow Federal agencies to coordinate assessment and authorization activities from the first step in authorizing cloud services to the ongoing assessment of the risk posture of a cloud service provider’s environment. However, FISMA requires that Federal agencies authorize and accept the risk for placing Federal data in an IT system. Consistent with existing law, agencies will maintain this responsibility within FedRAMP. However, FedRAMP will standardize and streamline the processes agencies use to accomplish assessment and authorization activities, saving time and money.

When Federal agencies consider implementing a cloud computing solution, there are seven key security areas they need to address: clear security authorization requirements, continuous monitoring, incident response, key escrow, forensics, two-factor authentication with HSPD-12, and auditing.

Clear Security Authorization Requirements
Because of the variability in risk postures amongst different CSP environments and differing agency mission and needs, the determination of the appropriate levels of security vary across Federal agencies and across CSP environments. Federal agencies must evaluate the type of
Federal data they will be placing into a CSP environment and categorize their security needs accordingly\textsuperscript{18}.

Based on the level of security that a Federal agency determines a CSP environment must meet, the agency then must determine which security controls a CSP will implement within the cloud environment based on NIST Special Publication 800-53 (as revised) and agency-specific policies.

Within this framework, Federal agencies need to explicitly state not only the security impact level of the system (i.e., the CSP environment must meet FISMA high, moderate, or low impact level), but agencies must also specify the security controls associated with the impact level the CSP must meet.

In order for Federal agencies to adequately provide clear security authorization requirements, they must:

- Analyze the type of Federal data to be placed in the cloud and categorize the data according to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199 and 200; and
- Include contractual provisions with CSPs that specify not only what security impact level a CSP environment must meet, but also what specific security controls must be implemented to ensure a CSP environment meets the security needs of the agency.

**Continuous Monitoring\textsuperscript{19}**

After Federal agencies complete a security authorization of a system based on clear and defined security authorization requirements detailing the security controls a CSP must implement on their system, Federal agencies must continue to ensure a CSP environment maintains an acceptable level of risk. In order to do this, Federal agencies should work with CSPs to implement a continuous monitoring program\textsuperscript{20}. Continuous monitoring programs are designed to ensure that the level of security through a CSP’s initial security authorization is maintained while Federal data resides within a CSP’s environment.

Continuous monitoring programs must be developed in accordance with the NIST Publication 800-137 framework and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance, detailed contractually, and must at a minimum address updates to the authorization based on any significant changes to a CSP environment, address new FISMA requirements, and provide updates to control implementations on a basis frequent enough to make ongoing risk-based decisions. By implementing an effective continuous monitoring program, Federal agencies ensure they have the proper view into a CSP environment. This allows Federal agencies to provide for the ongoing security and continued use of a CSP environment at an acceptable level of risk.

\textsuperscript{18} Agencies should refer to NIST FIPS 199 and 200 when categorizing the security level of the information systems they use to store Federal data.

\textsuperscript{19} See NIST Publication 800-137 and NIST Special Publication 800-53.

In order to effectively implement a continuous monitoring program, Federal agencies should:

- Fully understand the risks associated with a CSP environment when granting an ATO for use with Federal data;
- Work with CSPs to develop and implement a continuous monitoring program to ensure the level of security provided during the initial security authorization is maintained while Federal data resides within the CSP environment;
- Ensure that CSPs update their continuous monitoring program (and possibly security authorization) whenever significant changes occur to a CSP environment;
- Ensure that CSPs address all FISMA requirements as they are updated; and
- Ensure the CSP’s continuous monitoring program is designed in accordance with the NIST framework and DHS guidance and provides updates with a frequency sufficient to make ongoing risk-based decisions on whether to continue to place Federal data in a CSP environment.

**Incident Response**

Incident response refers to activities addressing breaches of systems, leaks/spillage of data, and unauthorized access to data. Federal agencies need to work with CSPs to ensure CSPs employ satisfactory incident response plans and have clear procedures regarding how the CSP responds to incidents as specified in Federal agencies’ Computer Security Incident Handling guides.

Federal agencies must ensure that contracts with CSPs include CSP liability for data security. A Federal agency’s ability to effectively monitor for incidents and threats requires working with CSPs to ensure compliance with all data security standards, laws, initiatives, and policies including FISMA, the Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) Initiative, ISO 27001, NIST standards, and agency specific policies. By doing this, Federal agencies will be able to adhere to DHS U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (U.S. CERT) guidance on incident response and threat notifications and work with the U.S. CERT to stay aware of changes in risk postures to CSP environments.

Generally, CSPs take ownership of their environment but not the data placed in their environment. As a best practice, cloud contracts should not permit a CSP to deny responsibility if there is a data breach within its environment. Federal agencies should make explicit in cloud computing contracts that CSPs indemnify Federal agencies if a breach should occur and the CSP should be required to provide adequate capital and/or insurance to support their indemnity. In instances where expected standards are not met, then the CSP must be required to assume the liability if an incident occurs directly related to the lack of compliance. In all instances, it is vital for Federal agencies to practice vigilant oversight.

When incidents do occur, CSPs should be held accountable for incident responsiveness to security breaches and for maintaining the level of security required by the government. Federal agencies should work with CSPs to define an acceptable time period for the CSP to mitigate and re-secure the system.
At a minimum, Federal agencies should ensure when implementing an incident response policy that:

- They contractually ensure CSPs comply with the Federal agency’s Computer Security Incident Handling guides; and
- CSPs must be accountable for incident responsiveness, including providing specific time frames for restoration of secure services in the event of an incident.

**Key Escrow**

Key escrow (also known as a fair cryptosystem or key management) is an arrangement in which the keys needed to decrypt encrypted data are held in escrow so that, under certain circumstances, an authorized third-party may gain access to those keys. Procedural and regulatory regimes in environments where the Federal agencies own the systems storing and transporting encrypted data are fairly well settled. These regimes, however, become increasingly complex when inserted into a cloud environment.

Federal agencies should carefully evaluate CSP solutions to understand completely how a CSP fully does key management to include how the key’s encrypted data are escrowed and what terms and conditions of escrow apply to accessing encrypted data.

**Forensics**

When Federal agencies use a CSP environment, the agency should ensure that a CSP only makes changes to the environment on pre-agreed upon terms and conditions; or as required by the Federal agency to defend against an actual or potential incident. Federal agencies should require CSPs to allow forensic investigations for both criminal and non-criminal purposes, and these investigations should be able to be conducted without affecting data integrity and without interference from the CSP. In addition, CSPs should only be allowed to make changes to the cloud environment under specific standard operating procedures agreed to by the CSP and Federal agency in the contract. As a best practice, cloud systems should include the Federal banner language so that users are aware that the site is monitored and could be subject to forensic investigations.

To ensure that Federal agencies are able to properly do forensics in a CSP environment, they should:

- Determine who will conduct forensics on a CSP environment;
- Ensure appropriate forensic tools can reach all devices based on an approved timetable; and
- Ensure CSPs only install forensic or software with the permission of the Federal agency.

**Two-Factor Authentication using HSPD-12**

When Federal agencies use cloud services where authentication, encryption, and digital signatures services are provided, they are required to use two-factor authentication based on
standard technologies\textsuperscript{21} through the use of Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards. The PIV cards must be compliant with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) which mandates a Federal standard for secure and reliable forms of identification.

Two-factor authentication to gain access to a CSP environment using HSPD-12 provides various benefits that add heightened security to agency use of cloud services. These benefits include (but are not limited to):

- Digital signature, encryption, and archiving of data;
- High trust in identity credentials;
- High confidence in an asserted identity when logging onto government networks from remote locations; and
- Use of a single authentication token for access to CSP environments.

When two-factor authentication is needed for cloud services, agencies are advised to include contract language requiring CSPs to use HSPD-12 compliant PIV cards. Such language would supplement the existing FAR requirements related to using the PIV card for contractor access.

**Audit**

FISMA requires Federal agencies to preserve audit logs\textsuperscript{22}. Federal agencies must work with CSPs to ensure audit logs of a CSP environment are preserved with the same standards as is required by Federal agencies. Federal agencies must outline which CSP personnel have access to audit logs prior to placing Federal data in the CSP environment. All CSP personnel who have access to the audit logs must have the proper clearances as required by the Federal agency.

Some key considerations for Federal agencies to focus on when ensuring that CSPs maintain audit logs to meet FISMA requirements:

- All audit/transaction files should be made available to authorized personnel in read only mode;
- Audit transaction records should never be modified or deleted;
- Access to online audit logs should be strictly controlled. Only authorized users may be allowed to access audit transaction files; and
- Audit/transaction records should be backed up and stored safely off site per agency direction.

**Privacy\textsuperscript{23}**

Federal agencies have a duty to recognize and consider the privacy rights of individuals as well as identify and address potential privacy risks and responsibilities that result from any data they place in a cloud computing environment. Federal agencies and employees can be subject to both criminal and civil penalties for misuse and erroneous disclosures of data that contains

\textsuperscript{21} Such as Security Assertion Markup Language 2.0 (SAML 2.0).
\textsuperscript{22} See NIST Special Publication 800-53.
\textsuperscript{23} The agency’s Chief Privacy Officer, Senior Agency Official for Privacy, or other privacy staff will be a valuable resource in conducting this analysis.
protected information, even when this data is in a CSP environment. Personal information, and specifically Personally Identifiable Information (PII), can relate to information about Federal agency employees, other internal users, and a broad array of individual members of the public and can be found in email, agency reports, memos, or even web pages. Federal agencies should consult their legal counsel and privacy offices to obtain advice and guidance on particular laws and regulations when data they place in a CSP environment will contain PII.

Five areas identified as key factors for Agencies to consider when PII is or could be a part of the data moved to the cloud environment are: compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and related PII requirements, privacy impact assessments (PIAs), privacy training, data location, and how a CSP responds to a breach. How a CSP addresses privacy concerns within their environment may impact the overall price and technical structure for a proposed solution, so Federal agencies are advised to gather privacy requirements as early as possible in order to fully understand how a CSP will enable an agency to maintain its duty to protect PII.

Compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and Related PII Requirements

The first step a Federal agency must take when outsourcing any information system, including cloud computing solutions, is to determine if the Privacy Act of 1974 (“The Privacy Act”), as amended, applies to the data that will be stored or processed. The Privacy Act establishes a wide range of privacy protection for covered Federal records in which information about an individual is retrieved by name or other personal identifier. Subsection (m) of the Act makes the Act applicable to any systems of records operated by a government contractor, including a CSP that operates a system of records containing such data. CSPs and Federal agencies should be mindful that there are both civil and criminal implications whenever the Federal agency or the contractor knowingly and willfully acts or fails to act as described in the Act. If a system operated by a CSP is covered by the Privacy Act, Federal agencies must ensure that CSPs understand the applicable requirements, and that contracting officers include the specific clauses required by the FAR in the solicitations and contracts for such cloud services.

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24 Under OMB guidance, PII is broadly defined as “information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.” Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-16.pdf.


26 Id. at § 552a(a)(4)-(5).

27 Id. at § 552a(a)(5).


29 When a CSP is determined to be a subsection (m) contractor, the records being handled by the CSP must not only comply with the Privacy Act’s requirements, but the CSP will also be subject to the criminal penalties provision of the Act.

30 See FAR Subpart 24-1, Protection of Individual Privacy; FAR 52.224-1 – 52.224-2 (2010).
When the Privacy Act applies to data Federal agencies will place in a CSP environment, the following are some key actions to consider:

- Determine the extent to which the Privacy Act will apply to data about individuals that will be maintained by the CSP solution, i.e., will any of that data be retrieved by name or other personal identifier?\(^{31}\);
- Ensure that, before the system is operated, the Federal agency has published or amended the applicable system of records notice(s) (SORN(s)) that covers the records in the Federal Register, and that the SORN includes all necessary routine uses,\(^{32}\) including a routine use that will permit disclosure of the records to the CSP for maintenance, storage, or any other CSP-provided service or use;
- Consider how the Federal agency and/or the CSP will provide individuals with the right to access and/or amend their records within a CSP environment, under the time frames legally specified in the Privacy Act\(^{33}\);
- Determine how the Federal agency and/or the CSP will provide individuals with the required statement of authority, purpose, etc., in a CSP environment, if the CSP solution will be used to collect information from individuals;
- Ensure the CSP can either meet or is contractually obligated to assist the Agency in meeting all other requirements of the Privacy Act (e.g. maintenance requirements, protecting against unauthorized disclosure, developing and maintaining an accounting of disclosures from any Privacy Act system operated by the CSP); and
- Ensure that the contract or other appropriate documentation clearly defines agency and CSP roles and responsibilities, including responsibilities in the event of any request for disclosure, subpoena, or other judicial process seeking access to records subject to the Privacy Act.

Furthermore, Federal agencies and CSPs must exercise care whenever they are handling any type of PII on behalf of a Federal agency, regardless of Privacy Act coverage\(^{34}\). PII includes all information about an individual and because that information may be used in unanticipated ways leading to harm and embarrassment, PII must be appropriately protected. Handling sensitive PII requires the agency and CSP to take even greater care because of the increased risk of harm to an individual if the sensitive PII is compromised. Sensitive PII may generally be thought of as PII, which if lost, compromised, or disclosed without authorization, could result in

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\(^{31}\) It is possible that moving data to a CSP will provide the Agency with a new or different method of organizing and retrieving records that will change whether the Privacy Act applies. For example, prior to moving data to the CSP, the agency may have retrieved records sequentially, and will instead under the CSP solution retrieve them by name or other identifier that would trigger the Privacy Act.

\(^{32}\) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) states “the term ‘routine use’ means, with respect to the disclosure of a record, the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible for the purpose it was collected.”

\(^{33}\) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d), (f).

\(^{34}\) The Privacy Act requires Federal agencies and contractors to have adequate safeguards and procedures for any systems of records subject to that Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10). This requirement is consistent with the requirement in FISMA that Agencies have system security plans for all Federal information systems, as discussed elsewhere in this document.
substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual. Further, the context and combination in which PII is used or located may also determine whether PII may be deemed sensitive, such as a list of employee names with poor performance ratings or a list of individuals with sub-standard credit ratings. Federal agencies and CSPs must, as appropriate, contractually document how sensitive PII will be secured by a CSP. Aspects of that agreement should discuss the following key areas:

- Federal agencies must assess all categories of PII they might place in a CSP environment;
- Collection of sensitive PII must be authorized by Federal agencies;
- Federal agencies should limit, to the maximum extent possible, the collection of sensitive PII;
- Federal agency and CSP copying or proliferating of sensitive PII should be restricted to the maximum extent possible; and
- How a CSP ensures the constant security of sensitive PII should be clearly defined.

Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA)

The PIA process helps ensure that Federal agencies evaluate and consider how they will mitigate privacy risks, and comply with applicable privacy laws and regulations governing an individual’s privacy, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an individual’s personal information at every stage of development and operation. Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002 requires PIAs when an agency proposes “new uses of an existing IT system, including application of new technologies [that] significantly change how information in identifiable form is managed in the system.” Typically, Federal agencies conduct a PIA during the security authorization process for IT systems before operating a new system and update as required by FISMA. A PIA must be made publicly available, usually on the agency’s web site.

When a Federal agency places any data in an information system, and in particular a cloud computing environment, the agency must complete a privacy threshold analysis and, if warranted, a PIA. Because CSPs may have different approaches for backup, disaster recovery, disposal, authentication, access control, and server locations, Federal agencies must fully

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35 This should include an assessment of whether the records contain any category of PII with unique statutory or regulatory protection in addition to the Privacy Act, such as, but not limited to, those records like protected health information (PHI) under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule (45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164 (2010)), tax information protected by the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 6103, et seq.), certain educational records protected by the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. § 1232g), and Census records (13 U.S.C. § 9). Obligations under these authorities may limit the options available for cloud deployments.


37 See OMB Memorandum M-03-22, OMB Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Sept. 26, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22/. This requirement also applies to any electronic information collection activity (e.g. online form, questionnaire, or survey to ten or more persons) subject to OMB review and clearance under the Paperwork Reduction Act.
understand a CSP environment and any third party tools used to develop them in order to properly conduct a PIA. Some of the normal PIA considerations to include are:

- What information will be collected and put into the CSP environment;
- Why the information is being collected;
- Intended use of the information;
- With whom the information might be shared (either by the Federal agency or CSP);
- Whether individuals will be notified that their information will be maintained in a CSP environment and what opportunities individuals have to decline to provide information that will be maintained in a CSP environment;
- What ability individuals have to consent to particular uses of the information, and how individuals can grant consent;
- How the Federal agency and CSP will secure information in the cloud; and
- Whether the Federal agency is creating a system of records under the Privacy Act (see above).

In addition, a cloud computing PIA should focus specific attention on:

- The physical location of the data maintained by the CSP;
- The retention policies that apply to the data maintained in a CSP environment;
- The mechanism by which a Federal agency maintains control over Federal data (e.g. by contractual provisions, non-disclosure agreements) that is maintained by CSPs; and
- The means by which the CSP will terminate storage and delete data at the end of the contract or project lifecycle.

Privacy Training

When Federal agencies place PII in cloud computing environments, they still maintain the duty to protect the data as if the data was stored on internal government environments. Federal agencies must ensure that CSPs are aware of the criteria the agency uses to identify certain data elements as PII, as well as the controls, safeguards, and training the agency expects the CSP to maintain, on its behalf, over the collection, use, retention, and disposal of PII.

If a Federal agency places PII in a CSP environment, Federal agencies must provide information privacy training and awareness to CSP personnel in accordance with FISMA, the Privacy Act, and existing policy. This includes general awareness and job-specific training for those who work with PII. FISMA does not make a distinction between CSP personnel and Federal agency employees who work with Federal data. As noted above, the Privacy Act, which also requires training, extends to contractors operating systems of records about individuals. In addition under FISMA, Federal agencies must prepare and make available to CSP personnel a training module, electronic or hardcopy, addressing the criteria the agency uses for determining how

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38 See, e.g. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m).
data is classified as PII or sensitive PII. Further, the training must include information on Federal privacy laws, regulations, policies, and penalties for inappropriate access and disclosure. Pertinent CSP personnel must be required to acknowledge their completion of the training module at the inception of the agreement, and on a periodic (typically annually) basis thereafter. The overarching objective is for anyone who has access to Federal data to understand their role in identifying and safeguarding personal information.

Key considerations for training include:

- Negotiating and allocating responsibility and costs of training (i.e. whether the Agency and/or the CSP will administer it and who will pay for it);
- Which CSP personnel shall be required to have training;
- What training shall be required, depending on the category of personnel to be trained;
- How often training shall be conducted (e.g. annually, quarterly, upon assignment to or employment under the contract); and
- What testing or other verification of training must be required.

Data Location

Many CSP environments involve the storage of data across multiple facilities, often across the globe. Where Federal data resides changes a Federal agency’s applicable legal rights, expectations, and privileges based on the laws of the country where the data is located. Federal agencies need to first consider the type of data they plan to place in a cloud environment, and then the laws and policies of the country where the cloud providers’ servers are located in order to fully understand who may have access to this data, as well as what ability a Federal agency has to retrieve privacy data as required by Federal law.

Almost every country has different standards and laws for handling personal information that CSPs must meet if they maintain facilities within their borders. Some countries allow persons with rights of access to personal information that may not directly align with the legal framework in the United States. Other countries may permit law enforcement to request more data from cloud providers than within the United States. It may not be clear how the privacy laws and protections apply in these situations. In any situation where a CSP environment goes outside of U.S. territories, there is a potential for conflict of law; and Federal

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agencies must take sufficient time to proactively consult with legal counsel about the possible ramifications.\textsuperscript{42}

Under the Privacy Act, Federal agencies must be able to inform individuals, in the applicable SORN, where their data is being maintained, which can be complicated in a CSP environment.\textsuperscript{43} The storage of Privacy Act records in non-U.S. facilities potentially subject to foreign law could also potentially affect the CSP’s ability to secure such records adequately from access by unauthorized individuals, or to make such records readily available to the Agency or the individuals who have a right to review or amend their records under the Act.\textsuperscript{44} The location of this data may also alter the privacy risks, and how the Agency describes and mitigates those risks in its PIA,\textsuperscript{45} what privacy training the agency would provide, and how the agency and/or CSP will respond to breach incidents.\textsuperscript{46}

Before signing a cloud computing contract, a Federal agency should take care to understand the CSP environment and where Federal data might reside. Some key things to consider include:

- Ensure the contract clearly defines the specific requirements for data in motion and data at rest (including the location of data servers and redundant servers);
- Fully incorporate the security controls as articulated in NIST Guidance in the agreement and understand how CSPs will implement those controls;\textsuperscript{47} and
- Contractually define a procedure for what CSPs must do in the event of any request for disclosure, subpoena, or other judicial process from outside the United States seeking access to agency data.

**Breach Response**

When placing Federal data that contains PII in a CSP environment, Federal agencies need to be aware of issues related to data loss incidents or breaches that are specific to the CSP environment. Federal agencies have longstanding specific requirements related to reporting and responding to incidents of possible or confirmed exposure of PII, no matter how a Federal

\textsuperscript{42} In addition, other Federal agencies may have negotiated arrangements on behalf of the United States with other countries or international organizations such as the EU or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that may help resolve some of these difficult issues. For example, the Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration has negotiated Safe Harbor agreements with the European Union and Switzerland with respect to cross border data flows that may serve as a model for future agreements. See \url{http://export.gov/SafeHarbor/}.

\textsuperscript{43} 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(A).

\textsuperscript{44} For example, the release of data by a CSP complying with the laws of a foreign jurisdiction to foreign law enforcement or other entity may result in unintended consequences for the agency and CSP.


\textsuperscript{46} As with all contract requirements, requirements dealing with location of a CSP and its facilities should not be arbitrary and based on unfounded and poorly defined terms; they should be precise, well-defined, and based on a clear rationale.

\textsuperscript{47} See generally NIST Special Publication 800-53.
agency becomes aware of the breach. This response and possible notification cannot be delayed while the legal responsibility for the breach is determined. However, existing agency breach response and notification policies, plans, and resources require evaluation and modification to adequately address the new relationship between Federal agencies and CSPs. Federal agencies need to ensure that they can expand their breach policies and plans as required to ensure compliance with existing requirements for response. These policies must specify which parties are responsible for the cost and containment or mitigation of harm and for notifying affected individuals where required, as well as provide for instruction and requirements on terminating storage and deleting data upon expiration of the agreement, or agreement term and extension options. Finally, any change to a breach policy is dependent on the agency privacy office being fully informed of the contractual and other responsibilities of the CSP and Federal agency in the event of incidents or breaches.

In order for a Federal agency to adequately respond to an incident or breach, the following are key factors to consider in a cloud computing contract:

- Ensure that an agency’s breach policies and plans adequately address the new relationship between the Federal agency and CSP, including the assignment of specific roles and tasks between the agency and the CSP, even before determination of ultimate responsibility in the case of a data breach;
- Establish clear contractual duties and liability of the CSP for timely breach reporting, mitigation (i.e., administrative, technical, or physical measures to contain or remedy the breach), and costs, if any, of providing notice, credit monitoring, or other appropriate relief to affected individuals as appropriate under the circumstances;
- Address when the termination of services, and assertion of the Government’s rights of ownership, custody, transfer (return) or deletion of any data stored in a CSP environment will be invoked by the agency as a remedy for a breach; and
- Ensure that there are appropriate audit rights to permit compliance reviews under applicable laws to allow the Federal agency to meet its duty as the data owner.

**E-Discovery**
Federal agencies will always be involved in litigation, whether it is employment litigation, contract disputes, policy defense, statute enforcement, or other legal actions. Federal agency data will always be a necessary component of litigation. Even now, IT resources are called upon to assist in responding to necessary litigation requests. Given the inevitability of agency litigation and the great potential costs and benefits of moving data to a CSP environment,

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49 When applicable this could include funding for identity protection/credit monitoring services. See *id.*

50 The agency’s e-discovery counsel or office will be a valuable resource in assisting in this analysis.
agencies must proactively plan for how to manage agency data in the cloud for litigation (both in preparing for and responding to legal requests).

In civil litigation, parties are permitted to request hardcopy documents or electronically stored information (ESI) from the opposing party that is relevant to any parties’ claim or defense. This is part of the “discovery” process permitted under court rules and case law. Electronic discovery (e-discovery) is the process of locating, preserving, collecting, processing, reviewing, and producing ESI in the context of civil litigation or investigation. The legal basis for e-discovery can be found both in established rules of civil procedure and in court decisions. Current case law requires that certain e-discovery steps be taken not only when litigation has commenced but when it is reasonably anticipated.

In contrast to traditional discovery of hardcopy documents, e-discovery has the potential to be vastly more expensive due to the sheer volume of ESI that Federal agencies generate and are required to maintain. Without proper pre-litigation preparation and discovery planning, the costs to Federal agencies for establishing compliance with discovery obligations can be exceedingly high. These costs result from not only the inefficient use of agency IT and legal resources to preserve, search, collect, and produce ESI, but may result from court sanctions for noncompliance with e-discovery obligations. For example, the court in In Re Fannie Mae Securities, held an agency in contempt for failing to meet discovery deadlines even though the agency had already spent $6 million (9% of its total budget) on discovery. Costs are also incurred if the court requires Federal agencies to redo discovery processes not properly conducted initially. Courts also have the power to sanction individuals – including counsel and in-house personnel – for discovery failures. At least one Federal court has noted that the United States “should take this duty more seriously than any other litigant.” Forethought, therefore, should be given to how data will be managed in a CSP environment, as agency data plays a central role in litigation.

When a Federal agency places Federal data in a CSP environment, it remains responsible for complying with legal requirements, including those relating to discovery. Federal agencies will

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51 See generally Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b) and 34(a).
52 See The Sedona Conference Glossary (http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf) and the EDRM model (www.edrm.net). The Sedona Conference Glossary also contains many helpful definitions of common e-discovery terms and concepts (both legal and technical).
53 See e.g. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 16 (Agreements/Scheduling Order); Rule 26(f) (Meet & Confer re ESI); Rule 26 (b)(2) (Inaccessible ESI); Rule 33 (ESI Interrogatories); Rule 34(a) (ESI New Category); and Rule 34(b) (Form ESI).
54 See e.g. Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 2011 WL 1815975 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2011) (“the proper standard for determining when the duty to preserve documents attaches is the flexible one of reasonably foreseeable litigation.”); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake IV”) (at the very start of a case or when litigation is reasonably anticipated, a litigation hold must be issued to prevent the spoliation of potential evidence).
have to locate, preserve, collect, process, review, and produce ESI that resides in CSP environments.

Five key e-discovery areas have been identified for Federal agencies to consider when implementing cloud solutions: information management, locating relevant documents, preservation of data, movement of documents, and potential cost avoidance through the incorporation of e-discovery tools in CSP environments.

**Information Management in the Cloud**

As with any information system, Federal agencies must be able to access and retrieve data in a CSP environment in a timely fashion for normal work purposes as well as litigation, discovery, and public access requests, including FOIA requests as discussed below. One consideration for Federal agencies is determining who should have access to Federal data in a CSP environment. A Federal agency must determine if it is appropriate for only the IT department or system owner to have access or if other agency employees, such as legal counsel and records managers, can access the data when needed without IT department involvement.

Another consideration is the possibility of third-party requests/demands (e.g. state or federal court subpoenas) sent directly to the CSP (and related subcontractors) for agency ESI. Federal agencies should ensure that the cloud agreement states that agency ESI in the cloud is owned by the agency and not the CSP or subcontractors. The agreement should also provide for notice to the Federal agency within a short period of time of any third-party request/demand for the agencies’ data.

Further discussion of information management is found below in the FOIA and Records sections, but two key considerations of Federal agencies regarding information management in a CSP environment include:

- Explicitly define data ownership and access protocols; expressly provide that ESI in the CSP environment is owned by the Federal agency and no other entity; and
- Clearly state that notice must be given to the Federal agency when and if a third-party request or demand is made for agency data.

**Locating Relevant Documents**

A CSP’s ability to locate specific information is key for e-discovery because discovery hinges upon the preservation, collection, and production of the relevant ESI. Cloud computing contracts should specify the process, time, and cost for CSPs to act upon these Federal agency requests. It is important that a CSP be able to document the process and specific timeframes (within hours/days) needed in order to comply with ESI requests. Additionally, Federal agencies should determine what costs are associated with a CSP locating and providing the relevant ESI as well as any additional charges for unusually large or expedited requests.

In order to ensure that CSPs have the ability to locate specific ESI required in e-discovery, Federal agencies should investigate specific software used for searching ESI in the cloud or...
incorporate standards for searching and retrieving information into the cloud agreement. For example, does a CSP have built-in features for e-discovery, so another software program does not have to be procured? Or does the cloud service only allow access for search, preservation, collection, and production by an external application, such as agency e-discovery application or another cloud-based e-discovery service? A CSP should explicitly explain the functionality of any e-discovery tool included with their cloud services.

Prior to signing a cloud computing contract, Federal agencies should ensure that their contract:

- Details the process by which a CSP stores, searches, collects, and otherwise handles Federal agency ESI;
- Clarifies who (Federal agency or CSP) will pay for ESI requests/searches and how the information will be identified;
- Defines what abilities a CSP has to search and retrieve specific information by source;
- Addresses potential data access issues or cross-border ESI transfer issues that may arise from data located in other jurisdictions\(^\text{57}\);
- Clearly identifies procedures in place for proper chain of custody. Ideally chain of custody should be automated to eliminate erroneous access of data and to immediately identify individuals accessing data; and
- Identifies what access methods/protocols will be available for access by external services/applications.

**Preservation of Data in the Cloud**

Litigation, or the prospect of litigation, requires Federal agencies to maintain data they may not otherwise have to maintain. As such, Federal agencies must be able to halt the destruction of agency data done in the normal course of business in a CSP environment when needed.

The process by which litigation holds are implemented in a CSP environment should be clearly established by the Federal agency and CSP before procuring cloud services. Typical CSP ESI recycling processes and procedures involve the destruction of vast amounts of data across the entire cloud environment affecting more customers than just the Federal agency. Thus, a CSP may not be able to suspend these retention procedures without affecting other unrelated customers. Federal agencies should contractually ensure any requirements for data preservation related to litigation holds are clearly understood and realized by CSPs.

Additionally, metadata associated with agency data should be preserved\(^\text{58}\). In some cases, courts have sanctioned parties that did not produce metadata associated with their documents\(^\text{59}\). Depending on the system configuration and cloud service, the original metadata

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\(^\text{57}\) *See generally “Data Location” on page 22.*

\(^\text{58}\) Metadata has been defined by some as the electronically-stored information that describes the history, tracking, or management of an electronic document. It is created automatically when a user creates, modifies, accesses, or takes other actions with respect to an electronic document. Metadata may show prior edits, editorial comments, author, file creation date, document access, or spreadsheet formulas. *See Aguilar v. ICE*, 255 F.R.D. 350, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

for ESI stored in the cloud may no longer technically exist. However, metadata can often assist in establishing the authenticity of the data and may be needed for a variety of e-discovery processing, review, or admissibility functions. Federal agencies should address this need with CSPs in the contracting process and when developing the agreement.

Key considerations for Federal agencies regarding data preservation in a CSP environment include:

- Federal agencies and CSPs should clearly define what retention procedures control agency data;
- Federal agencies should address how litigation holds can be implemented in a CSP environment upon direction from the Federal agency. Questions Federal agencies should ask CSPs include:
  - Can litigation holds be implemented by limiting the scope by custodian, key word, date, or a combination of these criteria?
  - How can a Federal agency verify that all the data is actually being held?
  - What additional cost will a Federal agency incur because of a litigation hold?
  - Once a hold is placed, how can a CSP change or modify the hold?
  - Does the CSP support multiple, simultaneous holds being in place? For example, a single custodian may be involved in multiple cases each with differing hold parameters.
- Federal agencies should incorporate needs to preserve metadata into the contract and information management procedures.

**Moving Documents through the E-Discovery Process**

Federal agencies may primarily focus on how data will be secured and stored in a CSP environment; however, key e-discovery concerns focus on the need to export or prepare data for production outside of a CSP environment. Federal agencies should proactively plan for the full life-cycle of data which includes having to potentially transfer a subset of data out of the cloud for litigation purposes. Federal agencies need to consider the means by which CSPs provide for searching and de-duplicating documents prior to transferring data out of the CSP environment and how data will be moved from the cloud to, for example, an e-discovery review database. CSPs must also enable Federal agencies to export ESI from the cloud in specific formats. The format of the data impacts not only litigation discovery strategies and negotiations, but the cost of discovery. Federal agencies must ensure that they clearly establish that the CSP can export and format the data in the agency’s manner of choice.

Eventually the data will be needed in court or other official proceeding. The agency should plan ahead and make sure that the CSP will have forensic or litigation experts available to answer questions and to sign affidavits regarding the data storage and retrieval process. The authenticity of the data, (i.e. potential evidence), may still be raised when using data from a cloud environment. A chain of custody log may be needed. In addition to having CSP experts available, Federal agencies should discuss in advance whether CSP personnel will sign chain of
custody affidavits to demonstrate the integrity of a specific search or specific ESI when needed for litigation purposes.

Key considerations for Federal agencies moving data through the e-discovery process include:
- How the data will be moved out of the cloud and into the e-discovery process; and
- Identification of the collection method and timing as well as who controls these actions to minimize impact on litigation budgets and strategies.

Potential Cost Avoidance by Incorporating E-Discovery Tools into the Cloud
The high cost of litigation and e-discovery is well known. Using e-discovery tools to streamline search, collection, and processing could help Federal agencies avoid great cost in litigations, congressional requests, investigations, and other types of data requests. Federal agencies should inquire if there is an option or offering for e-discovery capabilities as part of the cloud services provided. If the right e-discovery functionality and tools are incorporated into an agency’s CSP environment, there may be a potential for additional and significant cost avoidance and IT efficiencies.

Key considerations for Federal agencies for potential cost avoidance by incorporating e-discovery tools into cloud services:
- Federal agencies should explore the efficiencies of having e-discovery capabilities, such as data search and collection, incorporated into the CSP solution being procured.
- Federal agencies should evaluate the e-discovery resources needed when building requirements for the cloud in order to comply with e-discovery obligations as well as capitalize on the potential efficiencies and cost benefits of the CSP environment.

FOIA Access
As with the other topics discussed above, an agency’s obligations to comply with the FOIA do not change as an agency’s IT system moves to a CSP environment. The FOIA generally provides that anyone may request agency records, including information that is maintained in electronic form or in traditional paper files. Storing records in a cloud environment does not affect their agency record status. Agencies are required to produce information in any form or format requested by the person if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in that format.

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60 In one case alone it cost ~$1 million to collect, process, review, and produce 1 terabyte of data. In a mid-size case of ~350GB of ESI, for example, one agency spent approximately $140,000 for processing and had agency attorneys review documents for 528 hours. Another agency, for a smaller case of 210GB, paid ~$42,000 just to have the data collected from 20 employees. It then took 400 labor hours of one agency employee to search the material for production.
61 The agency’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) staff will be valuable resources in assisting in this analysis.
Cloud solutions present possibilities for efficiencies in Federal agency abilities to do robust enterprise searches for records responsive to FOIA requests. If a Federal agency uses a CSP environment, an integrated centralized searching component would expand the ability to locate, de-duplicate, and index responsive records. It could also save tremendous amounts of time and reduce search and processing costs to requesters.

**Conducting a Reasonable Search to Meet FOIA Obligations**

Federal agencies must be able to access and retrieve data in a CSP environment in a timely and efficient fashion because of judicially-enforceable statutory time limits that apply to agencies’ processing of FOIA requests. The Federal agencies may need to process large volumes of information to respond. In order to ensure agencies have the ability to search and locate specific ESI required for a given FOIA request, agencies should focus on search capabilities in the cloud. This may include considering specific software or the methods used for searching, or incorporating search and retrieval standards. Furthermore, agencies may consider whether a CSP has the capability to de-duplicate, de-conflict, thread, and redact documents, in order to prepare for production material that is potentially responsive to a FOIA request.

It is also possible that a CSP only allows cloud access for search, preservation, collection and production by an external application or another cloud-based tool. A CSP should explain the functionality of any ESI review tool included with their cloud services and how they can export out of the CSP environment. A CSP should document the process and specific time needed in order to comply with ESI searches – either those done by the agency or those done by CSP staff at the agency’s request – in the event that such costs are passed on to FOIA requesters.

Records searches undertaken pursuant to FOIA requests are extensive and encompass a variety of search methods which are employed based on the manner in which the agency (or agency component) maintains its records and the nature of the information being requested. Those searches may be conducted by a variety of agency personnel, depending on agency procedures, including staff in a FOIA office or staff in a program office that are likely to have responsive records. This search includes examining records custodians’ paper files, e-mails, and other electronic files.

The search may also include examining records storage facilities. Furthermore, it is common for a single FOIA request to require a search across the agency to identify all potentially responsive material and this could implicate a variety of paper and electronic search methods. Given these complexities, the result can be a large volume of files which must be de-duplicated, de-conflicted, and indexed before an analysis regarding responsiveness to the FOIA request and before an analysis for releasability under the FOIA, may be completed.

Finally, Federal agencies should consider whether cloud environments are searchable by the end-user. Agencies should explore with the CSP, in advance of executing a contract, the need to search for native active files and backup archives of the cloud system. In moving to the cloud,
agencies might lose the ability to search and retrieve, particularly in bulk, the native files or the archives of those files.

**Processing ESI Pursuant to FOIA**

Given the time constraints and costs associated with processing FOIA requests, using tools to make the FOIA process run more efficiently could help Federal agencies conserve financial resources. Federal agencies should inquire if there is an option or offering for an information review platform/database to be part of the cloud services provided that will help agency personnel prepare records for review and release pursuant to a FOIA request.

Federal agencies need to consider how data will be moved from the cloud to the agency’s FOIA processing system, if the agency’s infrastructure can host the data, and what means CSPs provide for searching and de-duplicating documents prior to transferring data out of the CSP environment. Cloud providers should enable Federal agencies to export ESI from the cloud on demand in non-proprietary formats. The format of the data impacts not only the ability of the agency to release information to a FOIA requester in their chosen format but the agency’s ability to efficiently process the information.

If a FOIA request becomes the subject of litigation, the agency will need to provide specific details regarding its records search and index the data for court proceedings. Agencies also should consider how a CSP can provide an index of documents retrieved and/or processed in the cloud environment, which may be needed to support agency declarations and court filings.

**Tracking and Reporting Pursuant to FOIA**

The reporting provisions of the FOIA statute require agencies to track and report annually on a number of FOIA operations, including statistical information on the number of requests received and processed, the disposition and processing time of those requests, and the backlog and oldest requests pending at each agency. Similar information must be reported for appeals of initial agency actions under FOIA. While most agencies already employ systems for FOIA tracking, they should consider the ability of a CSP to allow for the logging and tracking of FOIA requests, potentially providing a more scalable solution for the generation of FOIA statistics.

**Federal Recordkeeping**

In November 2011, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum on “Managing Government Records” that expressly referenced agencies “deploying cloud based services or storage solutions” as part of their records management programs.

65 Agency records officers will be valuable resources in assisting in this analysis.
66 The Presidential Memorandum directs the Archivist of the United States and the Director of OMB to issue a Records Management Directive containing specific steps in reforming and improving agency records management policies and practices. This Directive, when issued in mid-2012, will be informed by required agency reports devoted in part to describing how agencies are “deploying cloud based services or storage solutions.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/28/presidential-memorandum-managing-government-records.
An agency’s obligations to comply with the Federal Records Act (FRA) do not change as an IT system moves to a CSP environment. What does change is the way agencies can ensure that they maintain control over the management of and access to records covered under the FRA, including enforcing (through contractual provisions and otherwise) a fundamental understanding on the part of CSPs regarding Federal agency obligations under these laws. This issue can be compounded when the agency has previously focused its efforts on managing and scheduling records in a paper-driven environment, and/or provided only non-native versions of agency records to NARA as permanent records. In such situations, an agency may face a greater challenge in explaining its business processes or recordkeeping obligations to a CSP. It is crucial that a CSP fully understand Federal agency records obligations and needs so that the CSP can respond accordingly.

Federal agencies are required to schedule records for disposition, and retain all records until an approved record schedule is in place. Records that are permanently valuable to the United States are transferred to NARA typically when they are 30 years old, although NARA accepts electronic records earlier for “pre-accessioning.”

Four key areas have been identified for Federal agencies to consider and address in cloud contracts they relate to federal recordkeeping: proactive records planning, timely and actual destruction of records, permanent records, and the transition of records to new CSPs.

**Proactive Records Planning**

Many Federal agencies have older records schedules in place which fail to account for modern electronic records and may contain outdated references to superseded software platforms and applications. For these Federal agencies, a transition to cloud-based systems holds the potential to provide an agency’s records officer(s) with a chance to start fresh, identifying records and potentially updating schedules or creating them anew. Systems may be feeding into each and using data extracts to create new records. These relationships must be understood and the records managed in accordance with the FRA.

This is also an important time for system owners and records managers to educate each other about their responsibilities and capabilities. CSPs may not understand that some records in any given system that must be preserved pursuant to a record schedule. Record schedules

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67 See National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Bulletin 2010-05, Guidance on Managing Records in Cloud Computing Environments, Sept. 8, 2010 (“Federal agencies are responsible for managing their records in accordance with NARA statutes including the Federal Records Act (44 U.S.C. Chapters 21, 29, 31, 33) and NARA regulations (36 CFR Chapter XII Subchapter B). This is true regardless of which cloud service and deployment models are adopted. However, NARA recognizes that the differences between models affect how and by whom (agency/contractor) records management activities can be performed.”).  
68 See 44 U.S.C. 3303, 3303a.  
69 Records that are pre-accessioned remain in the legal ownership of the agency, but NARA is responsible for migration and other services. See http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/pre-accessioning.html; see also http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2009/2009-03.html
commonly require records be kept for seven, 10, 50, or even 75 or more years\textsuperscript{70}. As systems migrate and change, it is important that these records do so as well if they are not yet eligible for destruction.

To enable proactive records planning, agency records officers must be invited to be “in the loop” early in the procurement cycle, and in the subsequent transition to CSP environments that contain government data, including meetings with CSP personnel. If a regular communications channel involving an ad hoc group of IT, records, and other appropriate staff has not already been set up within Federal agencies, the transition to the cloud provides a prime opportunity for accomplishing multiple good ends.

As a key consideration for record planning in the cloud, Federal agencies need to incorporate records officers into the planning process early.

**Timely and Actual Destruction of Records Required by Record Schedules**

An important factor in proper recordkeeping is ensuring that authorized destruction or deletion of records occurs in accordance with agency schedules. For a variety of good records management reasons – including controlling the costs for continued storage, it is important that Federal agencies regularly dispose of records. While this is true whether an IT system is hosted internally or in a CSP environment, Federal agencies should consider the architecture of a CSP environment when determining an agency’s ability to dispose of records.

CSP environments can be configured in many different ways to facilitate the disposition of records according to Federal agency requirements. By ensuring the records manager is a part of the technical requirements creation of a cloud computing contract, the records manager can draft requirements for CSPs, including the ability to set a disposition date for categories of records within the system and have that automatically execute itself or send a file owner a notice when it is time to delete certain records\textsuperscript{71}. Federal agencies can also work to include an entire records management component as a part of a cloud computing contract\textsuperscript{72}.

\textsuperscript{70} For example, passport records are 100-year temporary records at the State Department, certain statistical research and survey files at the Social Security Administration are 100-year temporary records, and student loan files at the Department of Education have a 75-year retention period.

\textsuperscript{71} The General Services Administration’s request-for-quotes #QTA011GNB0010 for a blanket purchase agreement (BPA) for cloud based e-mail includes language addressing these issues. For example there is a requirement to “provide common APIs allowing integration with third party tools such as email archiving solutions, E-Discovery solutions, and Electronic Records Management Software Applications…and that also allow for the transfer of permanent records to NARA....”

\textsuperscript{72} Another option is a more robust records management functionally. In the GSA BPA for cloud based email (see footnote 67), there is an option for bidders devoted to Electronic Records Management including requirements to, “support an immutable email management solution integrated with the messaging system in accordance with the requirement for Federal agencies to manage their email messages and attachments as electronic records in accordance with [applicable laws]. These provide requirements for maintaining records to retain functionality and integrity throughout the records’ full lifecycle including: Maintenance of links between records and metadata, and Categorization of records to manage retention and disposal, either through transfer of permanent records to NARA or deletion of temporary records in accordance with NARA-approved retention schedules.”
CSPs must have the ability to permanently delete copies of ESI in accordance with existing Federal record retention schedules and policies. CSPs should also be capable of deleting back-up versions of ESI maintained as part of the overall cloud solution, in accordance with standard government procedures for recycling backup media. CSPs must clarify how they will retain or destroy ESI, and Federal agencies must ensure that the methods employed by the CSP meet the agency’s record retention requirements and that Federal agencies can verify destruction.

Federal agencies should incorporate the following key considerations related to disposal of records into their cloud computing contracts:

- CSPs must clarify their records disposition capabilities and ability to follow records schedules; and
- CSPs must be able to meet Federal agency permanent disposition needs.

**Permanent Records**

Permanent records are a crucial part of documenting our history for citizens now and in the future. Federal agencies storing permanent records in CSP environments should plan for those records to be transferred to NARA. For permanent records, it may be important to make regular copies of these records off of the live system in which they reside in order for them to be maintained for transfer, when appropriate, to NARA\(^73\). NARA will only accept certain file formats, per its regulations,\(^74\) making it particularly important that any system housing permanent records be capable of producing them in a non-proprietary format.

When a Federal agency is placing permanent records in a CSP environment, they must ensure the CSP environment allows the Federal agency to copy records out of the CSP environment for storage consistent with NARA’s accepted formats.

**Transition of Records to New CSPs**

All CSP contracts will last for a finite period of time. As such, Federal agencies must plan for retention of records and the transition of records between different CSPs and cloud environments when contracts expire or are terminated. CSPs may discontinue service or merge with new companies. Additionally, Federal agencies may decide to end certain services altogether, or the contract with the CSP or integrator may expire requiring re-competition with no guarantee of award to the incumbent. Whatever the reason a cloud contract comes to an end, Federal agencies should have a transition plan, with documentation describing infrastructure, records, files, programming, and other key facets of a CSP’s environment so an agency can successfully transition from one CSP environment to another CSP environment or to its own environment, if appropriate.

\(^73\) This is an area where each agency must consider its needs, the type of records in question, and its own business processes. Different processes and procedures may work well for different Federal agencies, but it is important to address the preservation of permanent records in each cloud based solution.

When records are transferred from one CSP environment to another, the agency will need to be able to ensure the authenticity and completeness of the data they receive. Federal agencies will also need to ensure that all records are deleted from the previous CSP environment once the transition is completed.

When beginning the procurement process with a CSP, these scenarios may seem to be far off, but it is crucial that Federal agencies plan for the entire lifecycle of a system and its records from inception to termination. When moving to a CSP environment, Federal agencies need to address FRA issues explicitly in writing at the beginning of a contract in order to ensure that an adequate historical record of the government’s actions is not lost in the cloud. Federal agencies should address and anticipate transition and transfer of data to other cloud providers over the life-cycle of a record.

**Conclusion**

Federal agencies are adopting cloud computing services more and more rapidly. This move to cloud computing represents a paradigm shift from buying IT as a capital expenditure to buying IT as a service. This requires Federal agencies to re-think the way they contract for IT in order to address elements unique to cloud computing environments.

By examining existing cloud computing contracts and through government-wide input, ten areas were discussed above that Federal agencies should address when creating a cloud computing contract:

- Selecting a Cloud Service;
- CSP and End-User Agreements;
- Service Level Agreements;
- CSP, Agency, and Integrator Roles and Responsibilities;
- Standards;
- Security;
- Privacy;
- E-Discovery;
- Freedom of Information Act; and
- Federal E-Records Management.

By addressing the elements above and including all necessary stakeholders when creating cloud computing contracts (e.g. OCIO, OGC, Privacy, Records, E-Discovery, FOIA, and procurement staff), Federal agencies will be able to more effectively procure and manage IT as a service.
Appendix A

**Suggested Procurement Preparation Questions:**
The questions below highlight several topics to consider when procuring cloud services. This is not an exhaustive list of all considerations, merely an informal guide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Who is actively involved in negotiating and reviewing the agency’s contract and ancillary Service Level Agreement for cloud services? a. Contracting Officer/Procurement? Chief Information Officer? General Counsel? FOIA staff? Records Officer? Privacy Officer? E-Discovery Counsel? Cybersecurity personnel? b. What is the process for developing the agency’s needs criteria and evaluating the cloud provider proposal and post-award performance?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> Are the unique operational aspects of the cloud computing environment addressed in the acquisition plan required by FAR Part 7? In particular, in terms of the written acquisition plan format described in FAR Section 7.105, how are technical, schedule and cost risks addressed, and has any test and evaluation program and Government Furnished Information (GFI) to be considered?</td>
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<td><strong>3.</strong> Based on market research conducted in accordance with FAR Part 10, does the acquisition plan contemplate use of a system integrator in addition to a Cloud Service Provider (CSP)? Will the CSP be a subcontractor to the system integrator, or will the CSP have a direct contractual relationship with the agency?</td>
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<td><strong>4.</strong> Is there a clear statement in the contract for cloud services that all data is owned by the agency?</td>
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<td><strong>5.</strong> Can the cloud provider access or use the agency’s information in the cloud? (PS-1, PS-7, CM-5, SC-7)</td>
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<td><strong>6.</strong> How is the agency’s data handled both at rest and in motion in the cloud? (SC-1, SC-28)</td>
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<td><strong>7.</strong> Who has access to the agency’s data, both in its live and backup state? (Sl-1, Sl-4)</td>
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<td><strong>8.</strong> In the cloud, what geographic boundaries apply to data at rest and what boundaries are traversed by data in motion? (CM-1, CM-8)</td>
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<td><strong>9.</strong> Where are the cloud servers that will store agency data physically located? (CM-1, CM-8, AC-4) a. Can the provider certify where the data is located at any one point in time?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>10.</strong> How will the cloud provider meet regulatory compliance requirements applicable to the USG, [including but not limited to the Privacy Act, the Federal Information Management and Security Act (FISMA), the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Federal Records Act, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Trade Secrets Act and related guidance and authorities]?</td>
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75 Several of these questions are addressed specifically in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 3. For convenience, the questions drawn from 800-53 reference the applicable controls (e.g. “SA”, “MA”, “SC”, etc.). Specific controls for specific USG agencies may vary significantly depending on agency-specific security requirements.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. What is the potential termination liability that would result from application of the contract clauses associated with FAR Part 49 Termination of Contracts? (SA-1, SA-2, SA-4, SA-12, SA-13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. How is the migration of agency data upon contract termination or completion addressed? (SA-1, SA-4, SA-2, SA-12, SA-13)</td>
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<td>13. How is agency data destroyed? (e.g. upon request? Periodically?) (MP-1, MP-4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Methodology used? (e.g. remove data pointer or overwritten in accordance with USG security standards)</td>
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<td>b. How does the cloud provider segregate data? If encryption schemes are used have the design of those schemes been tested for efficacy?</td>
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<td>14. If the cloud provider or reseller agreement incorporates “URLs” into the terms, which policies and terms are being incorporated into the agreement? (URLs are not static and change over time)</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. What notice is provided to the agency if URLs/policies change? Remedies for agency if new policies or URLs are not acceptable?</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. What remedies are being agreed to for breach or violations of the agreement? Litigation? Mediation? Waiver of right to sue?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Are choice of law and jurisdiction provisions in the agreement appropriate? (e.g. has the agency unknowingly subjected itself and USG to the jurisdiction of a state or foreign court)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Is the agency indemnifying the cloud provider in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act?</td>
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<td>a. What rights is the agency waiving, if any?</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. What limitations of liability, whether direct or indirect, is the agency granting?</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. How does the Force Majeure clause deal with the action of Federal agencies other than the customer agency?</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Can the agency manage content in the cloud with its own tools or only through contractor resources?</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. How are upgrades and maintenance (hardware and software) handled? (e.g. who conducts these activities? How often? And how is the USG advised of findings?) (MA-1, MA-2, SA-7, SA-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. How are asset availability, compatibility, software updates and hardware refreshes addressed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. What does the agreement say about estimated outage time the cloud provider foresees for standard hardware and software updates and the cloud provider’s estimated response time should an emergency take the system off line?</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. What responsibility does the cloud provider have for assuring proper patching and versioning control?</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. What language is in the agreement specifically requiring the cloud provider to take on this responsibility?</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Is there a discussion of how the cloud provider will continue to maintain or otherwise support the agency’s data in a designated format to ensure that the data remains accessible/readable over the life of the data?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### General Questions

22. Did the agency discuss with the cloud provider additional services that may be provided in the cloud, for example e-discovery tools?

23. Does the contract support IPv6 as outlined per the FAR?

24. If there is confidential statistical\(^{76}\) information at issue, does the agency agreement ensure the application of the provisions of the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002 or similar statutes that protect confidential statistical information to the information in question?

25. If there is confidential statistical information at issue, does the agency agreement contain provisions to ensure that either agency staff created and provided appropriate confidential statistical information training guidelines or actually delivered confidential statistical information training to the cloud providers?

### Service Level Agreement

1. Does the SLA have clearly defined terms, definitions and performance parameters?

2. Does the SLA define who is responsible for measuring SLA performance?

3. What enforcement mechanisms are in the SLA (i.e., what penalties does a cloud service provider have for not meeting the SLA performance measures)?

### CSP and End User Agreements

1. Before signing the contract, consider if the agency bound by the cloud provider’s Terms of Service (TOS) provisions, in addition to the contract terms and conditions?
   a. If so, how do those terms deal with privacy, cybersecurity, data disclosure/access, etc.?
   b. Is the TOS document proposed by the CSP the standard for industry practice or is it proprietary to that offeror? Can the TOS proposed be revised through negotiation?

### E-Discovery Questions

1. How does the agency or CSP halt the routine destruction of agency information in the cloud when a litigation hold has been implemented?

2. Does the agency or the cloud provider’s document retention/management plan apply to the agency’s data stored in the cloud? Is it understood whose plan has priority in cases when they conflict?

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\(^{76}\) Confidential statistical information may be defined as data or information acquired by an agency for exclusively statistical purposes under a pledge of confidentiality. See 44 USC 3501 Note SEC. 512(a).
### E-Discovery Questions

3. Is the metadata preserved when agency data is migrated into, out of, and within the cloud? (i.e., are transfers forensically sound)?
   a. Will the agency be able to search the data in the cloud by metadata field? For example, will the agency be able to batch search for all agency data in the cloud by original date created, file type, or author?
   b. Does the cloud provider ensure that metadata remains linked to records during data migration?

4. Pursuant to the agreement, does the agency itself have the ability to search, retrieve, and review agency data in the cloud? Using the agency’s own tools? Agency’s e-discovery contractor’s tools?

5. What are the agency’s file format export options for exporting agency data out of the cloud? What are the expenses associated with this process?

6. Is the cloud provider or a third-party providing e-discovery services to the agency?
   a. What specific e-discovery services by the cloud provider are included in the contract?
      i. [NOTE: E-discovery services can include the process of managing, identifying/locating, preserving, collecting, processing, reviewing, and producing electronically stored information (ESI)].
      ii. What specific tools are being utilized for these e-discovery services?
   b. Will the cloud provider or third-party provide training on the e-discovery tools offered?
   c. What project management resources will be available for the e-discovery services?
   d. Have the e-discovery services of the cloud provider or third-party been tested? If collection is one of the e-discovery services provided, is the collection method forensically sound?
   e. Can the agency modify the e-discovery protocol/process of the cloud service provider or third-party as warranted?
   f. How will e-discovery of data in the cloud be handled during user migration?
   g. Does the cloud provider have forensic or litigation experts available to answer questions and/or sign affidavits regarding the e-discovery services provide in the cloud?
   h. Will the cloud provider and third-party employees sign chain of custody affidavits to demonstrate the integrity of the ESI when needed for litigation purposes?
      i. If requested, will the cloud provider be able to supply the agency with audit trails, exception reports, and transaction logs?
   i. What if any additional charges will be required for e-discovery services discussed above?

7. Does the contract require that the agency fund or otherwise support the cloud provider’s response to a third party?

8. Is the contract clear that the cloud provider and all associated subcontractors shall not release any agency information and/or data without written agency approval or about circumstances when such approval is not needed?
   a. Is the contract clear that the cloud provider will notify the agency within a mutually agreed upon timeframe when a request for agency information or data is received by the cloud provider or subcontractor? Who is the designated agency point of contact(s) for this notice?
### E-Discovery Questions

9. If the agency desired to extract the data so that it can be loaded into a separate review platform, will work product from the cloud review platform be transferable to a separate review database?

10. Will attorneys and staff have immediate access to review the data in the review platform if hosted by the cloud provider in the cloud?
   a. Is there 24/7 access to the review platform?
   b. Can approved, non-agency personnel (i.e. other agencies or contractors) access the review platform in the cloud?

### Cybersecurity Questions

1. Does the contract include provisions to meet all FedRAMP requirements?
2. If authentication and digital signature are required, is HSPD-12 required as the standard?
3. Does the contract address how FISMA, TIC, ISO 27001, NIST standards, and EINSTEIN are applied by cloud providers operating in a non-USG (commercial) environment?
4. What is the CSP’s key escrow program for USG encrypted data and how are the terms and conditions of escrow applied to accessing encrypted USG data?
5. Is it clear that the agency’s owns all network logs, archived data, or other information and access to this must not be restricted? [NOTE: logs are needed by Federal agencies conducting, for example, OIG investigations].
6. What requirements (clearances, etc.) apply to cloud providers’ employees accessing USG data in a cloud environment?
7. What happens when material infringing on the intellectual property rights of the USG or others is located in a cloud system deployed by a cloud provider for the benefit of the USG?
   a. What level of indemnity and supporting insurance and/or capital will be provided by the cloud provider to the USG?
   b. What access to cloud provider intellectual property rights will the USG need to address various issues, particularly law enforcement investigations and audits?
8. What happens when USG data is stored or transported in non-banned environments and devices, particularly if those environments also contain data not belonging to the USG?
9. What security guidelines apply to operations of various cloud components and how are they measured for compliance? (SA-1, CA-2, SA-4, SA-13)
10. Was there an assessment by the agency or cloud provider of how server and telephony locations may impact access and security of the data? (AC-1, AC-16, SA-4)

### Privacy Questions

1. When implementing a cloud solution, did the agency consider whether any personally identifiable information (PII) would be involved?
### Privacy Questions

2. Did the agency consider whether any other categories of personal information, such as those protected by special privacy legislation and regulations like protected health information (PHI) under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, would be involved?

3. If there is PII at issue, did the agency assess whether the Privacy Act of 1974 applied to the PII in question?
   a. If so, did the agency ensure that the agreement included mandatory FAR language on operating Privacy Act systems of records?

4. If there is PII at issue, did the agency conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment in accordance with section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002 and OMB Memorandum M-03-22?

5. If there is PII at issue, does the agreement provide instruction and requirements on what to do in the event of a breach or unintentional release of PII?

6. If there is PII at issue, did the agency make any arrangements to ensure that either agency staff created appropriate PII training guidelines or actually delivered PII training to the cloud providers?

7. If there is PII at issue, does the agency agreement provide instruction and requirements on what to do in the event of any request for disclosure, subpoena, or other judicial process seeking access to the records which may include USG PII?

8. If there is PII at issue, does the agency agreement limit uses strictly to support the agency and prohibit uses for other purposes?

9. If there is PII at issue, does the agency agreement provide instruction and requirements on terminating storage and deleting data upon expiration of the agreement term and option extensions?

10. If there is PII at issue, does the agency agreement specify whether the data servers, including redundant servers, may be located outside the United States?

### FOIA Questions

1. Does the agreement address whether the CSP supports the agency’s FOIA process?
   a. If the agency has a centralized FOIA searching process, does the CSP facilitate this searching capability?
   b. If the agency requires each individual who may have responsive records to conduct their own search, does the CSP allow an individual to search and retrieve their own records?
   c. If the agency has FOIA professionals conduct searches for ESI, does the CSP provide appropriate access for FOIA professionals to agency custodians’ records systems?
   d. Are any time constraints imposed by FOIA taken into account in the agreements, so that the FOIA office has adequate time to review the documents?

2. Are there processes in place so that cloud provider adequately communicates with the FOIA office as needed?
### FOIA Questions

3. Pursuant to the agreement, does the agency itself have the ability to search, retrieve, and review agency data in the cloud? Using the agency’s own tools?

4. What are the agency’s file format export options for exporting agency data out of the cloud? What are the expenses associated with this process?

5. If the agency desired to extract the data so that it can be loaded into a separate review platform, will work product from the cloud review platform be transferable to a separate review database?
   a. Will FOIA professionals have immediate access to review the data in the review platform if hosted by the cloud provider in the cloud? Is there 24/7 access to the review platform?

6. Can approved, non-agency personnel (i.e. attorneys or contractors) access the review platform in the cloud?

### Recordkeeping Questions

1. Is the information that will be moved to the cloud-based system adequately scheduled as a Federal record?

2. Does the cloud provider allow the agency to destroy (truly delete) all copies or renditions of records from the cloud when appropriate?

3. Does the cloud provider allow the agency to implement records disposition policies across categories of records?

4. Does the cloud provider have a process that allows the agency to capture records that are appropriate for permanent preservation and transfer to NARA in accordance with NARA regulations as they may exist at the time of the transfer/accessioning to NARA, including file format?

5. Is the cloud provider using non-propriety file formats so that the data will remain useful outside of the system in which it was created?

6. Is the cloud provider capable of retaining the integrity of the files for the duration in which the agency’s records schedules contemplates them being kept?

7. Can the cloud provider migrate records to an agency’s in-house servers on demand, in the event it is necessary to do so?

8. If the agreement is for infrastructure as a service, has the agency considered the kind of record material which may be lost if the cloud provider were to change?

9. Did the agency consider if there were special substantive categories of records, such as vital records, being moved to the cloud for which increased records management attention is needed?