Health Affairs, 24, no. 4 (2005): 994-1004 doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.24.4.994

© 2005 by Project HOPE

This Article Full Text (HTML) Reprint (PDF) Submit a response to this article Alert me when this article is cited Alert me when eLetters are posted Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services E-mail this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in ISI Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to My Personal Archive Download to Citation Manager Reprints & Permissions Google Scholar Articles by Cook, D. M. Articles by Bero, L. A. Articles citing this Article PubMed Articles by Cook, D. M. Articles by Bero, L. A. Related Collections Business Of Health Consumer Issues Legal/Regulatory Issues Medicare Mental Health/Substance Abuse Politics

Tobacco Control

The Power Of Paperwork: How Philip Morris Neutralized The Medical Code For Secondhand Smoke

A new medical diagnostic code for secondhand smoke exposure became available in 1994, but as of 2004 it remained an invalid entry on a common medical form. Soon after the code appeared, Philip Morris hired a Washington consultant to influence the governmental process for creating and using medical codes. Tobacco industry documents reveal that Philip Morris budgeted more than $2 million for this "ICD-9 Project." Tactics to prevent adoption of the new code included third-party lobbying, Paperwork Reduction Act challenges, and backing an alternative coding arrangement. Philip Morris’s reaction reveals the importance of policy decisions related to data collection and paperwork.

Home

|

Current Issue

|

Archives

|

Topic Collections

|

Search/Browse

|

Subscribe

|

Contact Us

|

Help

© 2001-2005 Project HOPE - The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc. Terms and Policies